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# A Grand Coalition?
- URL: https://goodoil.news/a-grand-coalition/
- Published: 2026-11-11T21:30:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-11T21:29:59.000Z
- Description: Stabiliser or suicide? Cautionary tales from overseas.
- Author: Reproduced with permission
- Tags: NZ Politics, Election 2026

[**Ani O’Brien**](https://aniobrien.substack.com/p/grand-coalition-stabiliser-or-suicide)  
*Like good faith disagreements and principled people. Dislike disingenuousness and Foucault. Care especially about women’s rights, justice, and democracy.*

[Businessman Guy Haddleton would like Christopher Luxon and Chris Hipkins to sit down together](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/business-leader-guy-haddleton-urges-christopher-luxon-and-chris-hipkins-to-form-a-grand-coalition/premium/N2KMWMSTOBDPVOJVIRHTIKNCYY/?ref=goodoil.news) before either of them starts negotiating with any of the smaller parties. While I have no objections to the two major parties hashing out some of the gnarlier long term challenges we face, like infrastructure, our ageing population, and housing, the suggestion of any kind of Grand Coalition gives me the heebie jeebies. I know that many political tragics of either side feel similarly. We did not just endure a brutal election campaign in order to shack up with the guy we have desperately been hoping will be kept out of office.

However, if unscientific informal polls conducted online by media are anything to go by, other New Zealanders are not as repulsed by the idea as we are. Perhaps due to a desire to keep out their opponents’ extremists, some Kiwis seem happy to take on the moderates from the other side. We do tend to want everyone to get along and get on with it, but while this is an admirable trait in the school yard, work places, and at family dinners, a Grand Coalition comes with many more unintended consequences.

So, let’s have it out. Let’s take a look at the reasons why a Grand Coalition might appeal and the reasons why it should be avoided at all costs.

![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lpH-!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad4e7756-34a7-4325-9188-9ecd5847bff4_600x600.png)

For context, a summary of where we are currently in terms of the election result: preliminary results have National, ACT, and New Zealand First on 67 seats in a Parliament of 131, where 66 gives you a majority. National is ahead in 42 electorates with 29.2 per cent of the party vote. Between National’s electorate dominance and Te Pāti Māori’s in the Māori seats, we have a record 11-seat overhang. That has meant that National has no list MPs and senior National figures Nicola Willis, Chris Bishop, Paul Goldsmith, and Gerry Brownlee have all missed out. Meanwhile, Labour has 36 seats, the Greens have 16, and Te Pāti Māori have five. Even if they have Opportunity’s seven seats, they are two short of a majority with just 64 total. We now await special votes and recounts. Specials tend to lean to the left, but [projections published by Curia’s David Farrar](https://www.kiwiblog.co.nz/2026/11/hipkins%5Fhas%5Falmost%5Fno%5Fpath%5Fto%5Fpower.html?ref=goodoil.news) suggest we are likely to get the coalition back. He argues that even some favourable movements on specials would leave Hipkins short.

However, software entrepreneur Haddleton quite fairly sees the narrow margin between the two blocs as an uncomfortable prospect for our country as we are exposed to the ongoing considerable global economic uncertainty. Just one or two MPs could hold up a budget passing, for example. Together though, the two major parties have 78 seats based on preliminary figures. A much more stable government if you ignore the inherent instability likely to be generated by bringing together two parties that have spent decades viewing each other as mortal enemies regardless of policy overlap.

There is a decent argument for bringing together Labour and National to set long term agendas that then neither of them will be likely to reverse in the future. Certainty for massive infrastructure projects would give confidence to the sector and mean a lot less taxpayer dollars being wasted in the game of cancelling projects at each change of government. There is also a decent argument for locking in a plan for dealing with the ageing population and superannuation and making the tough decisions together so that the politics of opposition is removed.

[Former Labour minister Iain Lees Galloway wrote about this for Newsroom about three years ago.](https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/08/24/iain-lees-galloway-if-ever-there-was-time-for-a-grand-coalition-to-heal-our-rifts-its-now/?ref=goodoil.news) He argued that a Grand Coalition allows for the possibility that a political opponent might actually have some ideas worth contributing to solving a problem. Although given he is the current general manager for the Opportunity party and likely to become their chief of staff, I suspect his enthusiasm for the idea is considerably diminished. He makes a good point, though, as I know I would happily take a sound housing policy developed by National and Labour that produces results for New Zealand over an entirely National-created one that does not produce the results.

Lees Galloway is also correct to point out that there is much more agreement between the parties than people might assume from following both on social media. He put forward the example from 2023 when a transport bill went through 91 votes to 22\. The 91 votes came from National and Labour. The debates in the House that end up on the telly or in TikTok videos tend to be the most explosive moments of disagreement, but on issues of trade and foreign affairs National and Labour have tended to align. In foreign affairs this accord has somewhat eroded with Labour taking an approach to matters regarding Palestine and Israel that panders to some of the more extreme views on the left.

[*New Zealand Herald*’s Audrey Young has also written favourably about the prospect of a Grand Coalition.](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/audrey-youngs-grand-coalition-how-a-labour-national-power-share-could-work/premium/DSRDDZZZTZDKRISWW2L4JRTYBE/?ref=goodoil.news) She identified health as a key area that could benefit from cooperation. Certainly, with Labour on board it would be a novelty for National to be able to run a health system without the unions sabotaging them. Young predicts that more efficient delivery, less restructuring, better management of assets would result. She saw similar potential in the education space and again I point out that the biggest impact would probably be the neutralising of the unions.

The most common ‘*benefit’* proponents of a Grand Coalition foresee, however, is putting an end to what is often referred to as the ‘*tail wagging the dog’*. The veto power of small parties in coalitions exists because they are able to use their support for any number of policies as leverage for getting larger parties to agree to other things. The big parties cannot get stuff done without their smaller coalition members also agreeing. Even if we may be content to see the smaller parties on our own side exerting influence on our major party, both sides generally want the smaller parties on the other side to be restrained.

As Young wrote, without the anchors of the smaller parties, greater compromise is possible. For example, National might concede a limited capital gains tax in exchange for Labour agreeing to a rise in the age of eligibility for superannuation. Both would be provided political cover because they would back each other up. There would be no finger pointing and press releases as both would give something up.

This may seem like a fantastic utopian vision of consensus to some, but it is an utter nightmare for those who actually believe in the principles of their side and do not want them compromised on. It is also horrifying for those of us who appreciate the role the opposition plays in our adversarial system. Because part of the appeal of such a coalition is no doubt the neutralising of effective opposition. That means less scrutiny and challenge and more half-baked policies flying through parliament. Of course, the smaller parties would form some opposition but fragmented pushback pieced together between parties who loathe each other is not the same as an almost as strong oppositional bloc presenting a challenge to everything. The opposition aren’t there to be a pest just because they want to oust the government at the next opportunity, though that is the incentive at play. They are there to force the government to justify its decisions, answer uncomfortable questions, and to dig up anything being buried.

Suppose a National/Labour government makes a mess of the health budget and there are all sorts of poor consequences. Perhaps Chlöe Swarbrick, Winston Peters, Rawiri Waititi, or David Seymour would get stuck in to the failure and illuminate some issues. They are all capable of prosecuting a line of attack. But what would not be there would be the prospect of replacing the government responsible for the failure with its principal critic. This term of government Labour and Greens have played oppositional roles separately and collaboratively and New Zealand has known that along with Te Pāti Māori they could plausibly form an alternative government. That creates urgency for the government to sort itself out. There is no world in which a coalition of the small parties could create an alternative government and so the urgency is not as great.

The assigning of political blame still needs somewhere to go even if your government is a Grand Coalition. Looking at Austria and Germany, who both have had Grand Coalitions, it is evident that toxicity remains and accountability erodes. What I mean by this is that people don’t stop disagreeing. Dissatisfied supporters of a governing party tend to lay blame at the feet of the other coalition partner. They still have a sense of what they dislike and want to change, but they can no longer take much action at the ballot box to force it. The blame can circulate the cabinet table and then both sides vote for their party because they hate the other… and the two parties nonetheless form another Grand Coalition.

Guy Haddleton suggested Germany is a good example of why New Zealand should have a Grand Coalition. Even setting aside the role Angela Merkel played in the demographic destruction of Europe and how those chickens are coming home to roost, Germany’s experience is arguably not one of success. Sure, the first coalition from 2005–2009 was able to weather the financial crisis well by removing political roadblocks and appealing to a broad constituency.

However, it came at the expense of policies and a direction that each party’s supporters believed in and wanted to see achieved. [The New Zealand Initiative’s Oliver Hartwich wrote for the *Australian*](https://www.nzinitiative.org.nz/reports-and-media/opinion/should-nzs-luxon-hipkins-consider-grand-coalition?ref=goodoil.news) that Merkel had campaigned prior to the Grand Coalitions on tax simplification and labour market reform, but these plans were shelved when making concessions. A majority large enough to make difficult reforms possible also makes it easier for each party to stop the other doing things that their supporters want them to do. That means reforms pass, but the compromise required squeezes a lot of the substantially impactful aspects out. And without any teeth, the issues reforms were intended to solve remain unaddressed. In this sense, the idea that Grand Coalitions are disrupters of the status quo is completely wrong. They inevitably end up entrenching it.

Germany also demonstrates how the shape of opposition changes in response to Grand Coalitions. As I say, there needs to be enough cohesion in opposition to present a distinct alternative. The way that cohesion tends to evolve is via growing dislike of both sides of the coalition as a combined force. That means a party or collection of parties is required to be more different to the government than other potential coalition partners would be. After the second Merkel Grand Coalition, Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered the Bundestag in 2017\. By forming a Grand Coalition, the two larger parties left the AfD to be the voice of the opposition. Any dissatisfaction with the government was thus laundered through the policies and perspective of the party many call ‘*far right’*. This is not an essay about their evolution as a party and I accept that there are varying views on it.

Hartwich argues that repeatedly closing off the choice between the Christian Democrats and the SPD actually drove disaffected voters towards the AfD. Although he does emphasise that other issues also played a role in this like migration and alienation in eastern Germany. In a paper called ‘[*Coalition type and voter support for parties: Grand coalitions in German elections*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379411000709?via%3Dihub&ref=goodoil.news)’ researchers examined voters before and after two German Grand Coalitions and found that after they were much more willing to ditch their original party allegiances and support a party outside of the coalition. How far they moved was dependent largely on what parties were available to them. Right now, in New Zealand, those options are ACT, Greens, Te Pāti Māori, New Zealand First, and now Opportunity Party. But after a few terms of a Grand Coalition there is no guarantee that those would be the parties people would look to as alternatives. Or perhaps they would be, but on each side they would have morphed into something unrecognisable.

This is all to say, that as in physics it is in politics. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.

Austria is another good example of the perils of Grand Coalitions and how concessions can come back around to bite you in the bum. In their 2006 election the Social Democrats emerged the strongest party and so when they formed a Grand Coalition with the conservative People’s Party, their leader Alfred Gusenbauer became the prime minister. You might think this meant they had the upper hand and were, in effect, leading the coalition. Instead, they failed to secure key election promises to abolish university fees and to cancel military aircraft purchases, in their coalition agreement. They swapped their mandate for power and that power was diluted. To make matters worse after just 18 months their coalition partner dumped them. A Grand Coalition is an effective tool if your goal is to stop your opponent from doing something, not so much if you want to achieve things yourself.

Haddleton also points to Ireland as an example and our former Ambassador to Ireland Sir Trevor Mallard enthusiastically agrees. [Speaking to Audrey Young earlier this year](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/audrey-youngs-grand-coalition-how-a-labour-national-power-share-could-work/premium/DSRDDZZZTZDKRISWW2L4JRTYBE/?ref=goodoil.news), he gushed about how Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael agreed to govern with the Greens in 2020\. Their rivalry goes back to opposite sides of the civil war divide and yet they came together with a role-sharing arrangement for leadership. Micheál Martin went first as Taoiseach and then Leo Varadkar followed. Chlöe Swarbrick would have called them co-Taoiseachs. They renewed their coalition in January 2025.

But again, in Ireland we can see Newton’s pesky Third Law. You see part of the reason Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael joined forces was to keep Sinn Féin out. They are a left-wing party who still seek for Northern Ireland to be liberated from the United Kingdom and to join the Republic. For decades they were regarded as the political wing of the Provisional IRA, the group responsible for bombings and shootings that killed civilians, soldiers, and police. While the IRA’s armed campaign is over (or dormant depending who you ask), Fianna Fáil openly questioned if the IRA still had a say in Sinn Féin’s decisions. Fine Gael were concerned that the party was opposing Ireland’s special court that tries terrorism cases. Both had reasons for not wanting to bring the party into government and made the calculation that it was better to work together. However, as was the case with the AfD, leaving Sinn Féin out the Grand Coalition made them the voice of opposition. The party remains the highest polling party as of an October 2026 poll.

[Otago University Law Professor Andrew Geddes has written about the challenge of party identity in Grand Coalitions](https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/11-05-2026/the-grand-coalition-idea-is-gaining-traction-heres-why-it-wouldnt-work?ref=goodoil.news). He points out that emotion and self-interest are powerful factors in politics and Grand Coalitions override them. He argues that:

> *“Forming a NatLab collab would involve a major reorientation within a group of people that all have cut their political teeth on stories of conflict with, and triumph over, the other. Within that political culture, it’s hard to gain traction for arguments that joining your enemy is for the best of the country.”*

He raises the problem of who would become prime minister and how the other party would stomach it. Ireland came up with a job-sharing arrangement of taking turns and this appears to have worked okay for them. But that is not always the case. Japan tried an unusually generous arrangement in the 1990s when the conservative Liberal Democrats backed their longtime Socialist rival Tomiichi Murayama for prime minister despite being the larger party. Perhaps they were playing the long game as after 18 months the 71-year-old stepped down exhausted and facing criticism for having made concessions. The larger Liberal Democrats then voted their own leader in as prime minister.

There are other examples. Israel and Denmark, to name two more. But I will not continue this political history lecture as I hope you see the points I am making of the pitfalls of Grand Coalition arrangements. The road to hell, as they say, is paved with good intentions. And generous assumptions. A particularly generous one was criticised by Professor Geddes in response to the self-important advocacy of Auckland Mayor Wayne Brown. He pointed out:

> *“An initial problem with this sort of individualised take on government is that it assumes that capable and intelligent people rise to the top of an organisation. I simply note that evidence does not necessarily back up this claim.”*

Many of the arguments *for* a Grand Coalition are fair enough and based on some logic. The problem is that there are plenty of arguments against it too. And in my view those arguments far outweigh the pros. Consensus becomes concession far too quickly and locking out rivals becomes giving them a powerful voice as the alternative.

Not to mention that more than half of New Zealand voted for one or other of the main parties with the expectation that they would form a coalition with their allies, not with their primary opponent. The campaigns of each party were centred on offering competing visions for New Zealand. Adding together the votes they received essentially *against each other* and calling that sum total a mandate is pretty audacious and disingenuous.

Working across the aisle is possible, and desirable, without forming a government together. Why does reaching an agreement on the age of pension eligibility require us to give up the vital role of a strong opposition? The role belongs to us, the public. We are entitled to have a robust adversarial system in which the opposition finds the flaws and faults. We should always have a semi-viable alternative to the current government to keep it on its toes and responsive to the mood of the population.

In my view, the politicians in power owe it to New Zealanders to respond to their collective mandate no matter how the votes fall after specials and recounts. If the specials leave National, ACT, and New Zealand First with the numbers, they should get on with forming a government together. If the votes shift and the left bloc have the numbers they should do the same. Either outcome will disappoint some, but the disappointed should take up the important place across the aisle in order to examine what the winners do with the power, challenging their decisions, and preparing to offer an alternative in three years’ time.

---

###### Sources:

###### [*The Balance Sheet of the Grand Coalition*](https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/a-new-germany-1990-2023/the-balance-sheet-of-the-grand-coalition-september-17-2009?ref=goodoil.news)[ (September 17, 2009)](https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/a-new-germany-1990-2023/the-balance-sheet-of-the-grand-coalition-september-17-2009?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [*‘The ‘grand coalition’ idea is gaining traction. Here’s why it wouldn’t work’*](https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/11-05-2026/the-grand-coalition-idea-is-gaining-traction-heres-why-it-wouldnt-work?ref=goodoil.news)[ Andrew Geddis, 11 May 2026](https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/11-05-2026/the-grand-coalition-idea-is-gaining-traction-heres-why-it-wouldnt-work?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [*‘Should NZ’s Luxon, Hipkins consider grand coalition?’* ](https://www.nzinitiative.org.nz/reports-and-media/opinion/should-nzs-luxon-hipkins-consider-grand-coalition?ref=goodoil.news)[Dr Oliver Hartwich, The Australian, May 2026](https://www.nzinitiative.org.nz/reports-and-media/opinion/should-nzs-luxon-hipkins-consider-grand-coalition?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [Simone Burkhart, Reforming Federalism in Germany: Incremental Changes instead of the Big Deal, ](https://academic.oup.com/publius/article-abstract/39/2/341/1825888?ref=goodoil.news)[*Publius: The Journal of Federalism*](https://academic.oup.com/publius/article-abstract/39/2/341/1825888?ref=goodoil.news)[, Volume 39, Issue 2, Spring 2009, Pages 341–365.](https://academic.oup.com/publius/article-abstract/39/2/341/1825888?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [Lee Ann Banaszak, Peter Doerschler, Coalition type and voter support for parties: Grand coalitions in German elections, ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379411000709?via%3Dihub&ref=goodoil.news)[*Electoral Studies*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379411000709?via%3Dihub&ref=goodoil.news)[, Volume 31, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 46-59.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379411000709?via%3Dihub&ref=goodoil.news)

###### [Markus Salzmann, Austria: End of the grand coalition, ](https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/07/aust-j18.html?ref=goodoil.news)[*World Socialist Web Site*](https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/07/aust-j18.html?ref=goodoil.news)[, 18 July 2008](https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/07/aust-j18.html?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [Morini M, Loveless M. Losers together? Grand coalitions in the EU member states. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/italian-political-science-review-rivista-italiana-di-scienza-politica/article/losers-together-grand-coalitions-in-the-eu-member-states/BCB2D511CA305E98499FDF94EC725423?ref=goodoil.news)[*Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/italian-political-science-review-rivista-italiana-di-scienza-politica/article/losers-together-grand-coalitions-in-the-eu-member-states/BCB2D511CA305E98499FDF94EC725423?ref=goodoil.news)[. 2021;51(3):404-418.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/italian-political-science-review-rivista-italiana-di-scienza-politica/article/losers-together-grand-coalitions-in-the-eu-member-states/BCB2D511CA305E98499FDF94EC725423?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [David R. Camero, Civil War politics finally ends in Irish parliament: Fianna Fáil & Fine Gael form coalition, ](https://macmillan.yale.edu/stories/civil-war-politics-finally-ends-irish-parliament-fianna-fail-fine-gael-form-coalition?ref=goodoil.news)[*MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale*](https://macmillan.yale.edu/stories/civil-war-politics-finally-ends-irish-parliament-fianna-fail-fine-gael-form-coalition?ref=goodoil.news)[, June 29 2020](https://macmillan.yale.edu/stories/civil-war-politics-finally-ends-irish-parliament-fianna-fail-fine-gael-form-coalition?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [Japan’s previous coalition governments, ](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/1999/01/14/national/japans-previous-coalition-governments/?ref=goodoil.news)[*The Japan Times*](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/1999/01/14/national/japans-previous-coalition-governments/?ref=goodoil.news)[, January 14 1999](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/1999/01/14/national/japans-previous-coalition-governments/?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [**Iain Lees-Galloway, If ever there was time for a grand coalition to heal our rifts, it’s now,** ](https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/08/24/iain-lees-galloway-if-ever-there-was-time-for-a-grand-coalition-to-heal-our-rifts-its-now/?ref=goodoil.news)[***Newsroom***](https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/08/24/iain-lees-galloway-if-ever-there-was-time-for-a-grand-coalition-to-heal-our-rifts-its-now/?ref=goodoil.news)[**, 24 August 2023**](https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/08/24/iain-lees-galloway-if-ever-there-was-time-for-a-grand-coalition-to-heal-our-rifts-its-now/?ref=goodoil.news)

###### [Audrey Young, Audrey Young’s grand coalition: How a National-Labour power share could work, ](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/audrey-youngs-grand-coalition-how-a-labour-national-power-share-could-work/premium/DSRDDZZZTZDKRISWW2L4JRTYBE/?ref=goodoil.news)[*New Zealand Herald,*](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/audrey-youngs-grand-coalition-how-a-labour-national-power-share-could-work/premium/DSRDDZZZTZDKRISWW2L4JRTYBE/?ref=goodoil.news)[ 6 May 2026](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/audrey-youngs-grand-coalition-how-a-labour-national-power-share-could-work/premium/DSRDDZZZTZDKRISWW2L4JRTYBE/?ref=goodoil.news)

###### 

This article was originally published by [Thought Crimes](https://aniobrien.substack.com/p/grand-coalition-stabiliser-or-suicide).