Behrouz Ayaz
Behrouz Ayaz is an Iranian political analyst who specializes in foreign policy of Iran, Afghanistan, South Asia and Terrorism.
Dr Julian Spencer-Churchill
Julian Spencer-Churchill is an associate professor of international relations at Concordia University and the author of Militarization and War (2007) and Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014).
Nuclear talks between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Trump administration took place on April 12 and 19, in Oman and Italy respectively. US President Donald Trump initially stated his optimism, widely reported in Iran, but talks have since been suspended. During his first term as president, he was a staunch opponent of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), viewing it as contrary to the national interests of the United States and Israel. Despite his ally, Israel, opposing any US deal with Iran, Trump has indicated a willingness to negotiate with Tehran. The Trump administration even rejected an Israeli proposal for a joint air strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
From the perspective of the administration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the primary purpose of the negotiation with Washington is to prevent a joint attack by Washington and Tel Aviv on Iran’s nuclear power plants and facilities. Trump threatened repeatedly that if Tehran was unwilling to negotiate, the US would bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, a policy that was welcomed by Israeli officials. The current administration in Tehran is also concerned with the impact of a large-scale aerial campaign against its continued tenure. This is telling, since Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, had also previously banned any negotiations with the Trump administration. Khamenei criticized Trump’s aggressive rhetoric as counterproductive. He also warned that there would be a tough response to the US if nuclear and military centers are bombed, although Iran’s weak strikes against Israel undermined this deterrent.
Any resulting pact between the two countries, such as one similar to the JCPOA, is motivated primarily by security and not the economic incentive of removing the sanctions, which Trump is unlikely to do permanently anyway. Although the Biden and Trump administrations have instituted wide-ranging sanctions against Iran and against its oil customers, Tehran’s primary source of budgetary revenue, Iran’s economic woes are substantially the result of its own financial mismanagement and corruption in the banking sector. There is also a significant underground economy in Iran, which services financial transfers circumventing the sanctions, and is operated by interests that are economically and therefore politically impactful. Over the years, these interests have established many companies in European countries, especially Germany, to circumvent/dodge sanctions.
The major geopolitical enabler of negotiations is that Tehran feels itself strategically expendable by Russia and even China, despite recent agreements. Russia and Iran signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2025 that is mostly focused on economic transactions, a priority in Tehran, and there are arrangements to help circumvent sanctions for both parties. However, the public sentiment of the Iranian people considers Russia to be a contributor of Iran’s isolation and economic instability. Of the six resolutions issued by the United Nations Security Council between 2006 and 2010, Russia did not veto any of them, leading to the broad sanctions regime against Iran. It is widely believed that Moscow has never been a reliable partner and has not supported Iran at critical junctures. From the occupation of Iran after the second world war, to its aid to Iraq during the eight-year war against Iran.
Russia has used Iran as an expendable ‘card’ in international forums for years. According to a survey by the Copenhagen-based Foundation for the Alliance of Democracies, more than 50 per cent of Iranians have a negative view of Russia, while only 15 per cent have a relatively positive view of it. According to a Gallup poll in 2011, only 13 per cent of Iranians approve of Russia’s role in the world, while 52 per cent have a negative view of it. Paradoxically, some Iranians view US pressure on Kyiv to submit to Russian ceasefire demands as akin to the unfair treaties imposed by St Petersburg following Russian invasions of Persia. At that time, Iran had alleged allies who abandoned Tehran at the moment of aggression. Neither the Ottomans, nor England, nor France, despite agreements, helped Iran. Seeing the examples of Armenia, Kazakhstan and even Ukraine, Iranians are concerned about a Russian reaction if Iran tilted westward.
The ambivalent attitude towards Moscow is based on two invasions of the 19th century that decisively and permanently reduced the size of Persia in the Caucasus: these are the Ten Years’ War (1803–1813) and Two Years’ War (1826–1828). The annexations were formalized in the two treaties of Golestan and Turkmenchay. Even after two centuries, Iranians are taught those events in grade school texts and remember that era with regret, and consequently distrust Russia more than any other neighboring country. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s territorial expansionism is currently being experienced by Tehran in disputes in the Caspian Sea, in which Iran saw a loss of 11 per cent of its sovereign claims. In December of 2023, Moscow, appealing to Persian Gulf Arab interests, questioned Iran’s territorial integrity and its control of Gap-Sabzu (Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands). Russia has also sacrificed Iran’s position on the Zangezur corridor, linking Azerbaijan and Nakchivan, in its regional negotiations. It was this equivocal viewpoint that restrained Tehran from seeking to improve relations with the USSR after the 1977–79 Islamic revolution in Iran, despite persistent threats from the US and its allies.
Nevertheless, strategic compulsions of Persian nationalism provides public support for Tehran’s pursuit of security within its purported sphere of influence. Despite denials, Tehran most recently provided 200 surface-to-surface missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine, a war that it did not condemn. Iran had sent “Shahed drones” to Russia early on.
Policymakers in Tehran believe that Iran may be discarded once Moscow makes peace with Ukraine. Russia will likely deepen diplomatic coordination with Israel. Tel Aviv, inclined to support Ukraine in its war, does not see any obstacle to an improvement in its relations with Moscow, now that Syria has been neutralized by a Turkish-backed political movement. Moscow will pursue intelligence collaboration with Israel, including steps to compromise Russian supplied air defense systems. When Israel targeted Iranian bases in Syria, Russia assisted it. According to one IRGC commander, the Russians turned off radars so that Israel could strike at Iranian commanders.
Russia may even come to a broader agreement with the US, Israel, and even Arab countries on Iran. On February 15, 2025, Washington’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, claimed that a primary goal for Washington was to ‘break’ the Russia-Iran alliance. While some Arab countries benefitted from sanctions on Russian oil, both as exporters and importers, these may be offset by investment opportunities with the US and Israel. Russia needs the cooperation of OPEC and its wealthy Arab members to stabilize its economy. In effect Moscow’s tactical view of Iran, and Tehran’s strategic view of Russia, makes Iran far more disposable.
Consequently, Moscow is not likely to interfere with Washington’s nuclear negotiations and threats of the use of military force against Iran, to impose a new agreement. The original agreement was signed by Iran on July 14, 2015, the JCPOA with the so-called P5+1, including both Russia and China. Tehran agreed to adhere to four measures:
1– Accepting quantitative limits on the number of its centrifuges, with a cap of 6,104 placed on its possible total stock of 19,000.
2– Limits to using just the first-generation IR 1, not advanced centrifuges.
3– Halting enrichment to 3.67 per cent of uranium-235.
4– Shipping out enriched uranium in excess of the 300-kilogram limit of 3.67 per cent.
In return, the United Nations issued a resolution (2231) for the termination of the provisions of previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue. The US was also scheduled to lift the relevant sanctions imposed on Iran. The IAEA confirmed that Iran had complied with all of its required undertakings under the JCPOA.
However, in 2016, Trump called the nuclear pact a “disaster” and “the worst deal ever negotiated” during his campaign, and said it could lead to a “nuclear holocaust.” He threatened to withdraw from the JCPOA if he won the election, and he did, in May of 2018.
Iran now has more than 13,000 centrifuges, 5,700 of which are the advanced second-generation IR-9 centrifuge, in use of at the Natanz facility since 2021. Currently, Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is more than 6,200 kg (13,671.5 pounds). The IAEA estimated that “as of February 8, 2025, Iran’s uranium stockpile contained 7,464.0 kg of uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 274.8 kg of which was enriched up to a level of 60 per cent in the fissionable isotope U-235, 606.8 kg of which was enriched up to a level of 20 per cent U-235."
What is interesting is that Trump has shifted his position on negotiating with Iran. In 2016, Trump considered the JCPOA to be detrimental, not only to the US, but also to Israel, and he withdrew from the agreement. Whilst now, despite Israel’s dissatisfaction with the ongoing negotiations, Trump insists on continuing negotiations with Tehran. Trump’s policy pivot is driven by three new considerations.
First, Trump’s willingness to negotiate with Iran is a function of Washington’s larger Asia policy. What is clear is that Trump is seeking to isolate China from its closest potential allies of Russia and Iran (Pakistan, Myanmar, and North Korea having already either been co-opted or are unco-optable). Washington’s nuclear cooperation with Riyadh is intended to weaken Beijing’s influence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and re-establish US influence in the region.
This divide-and-conquer policy is feasible because Tehran sees itself as a major historical power, and has therefore demonstrated a reluctance to establish alliances in which it is a junior partner. Hence the absence of close security relationships with any of Russia, China, Pakistan, India, or North Korea. Tehran may expect the legal backing of Moscow and Beijing in international fora: it welcomed Russia’s recent condemnation of Trump’s hardline rhetoric. In March, in response to Trump’s threat to bomb Iran’s military and nuclear facilities, Iranian representatives sought to undermine international support for Trump’s policy by filing complaints with the UN Security Council.
Second, Trump recognizes that only the US Navy and Marines, not the combined navies of Europe and democratic East Asia, are capable of wrestling open the key maritime chokepoints that bottleneck international commerce. After taking office, Trump focused heavily on important international straits and strategic bottlenecks, the control of which will be necessary in the event of a blockade of China. This is not limited to the Straits of Hormuz, although Washington is concerned about the prospect of Tehran closing the Straits in a Taiwan contingency. The US military attack on Yemeni Houthi positions (which aligns with Saudi Arabia’s interests), and the attempt to restore the former Yemeni government to power in Sanaa, can be seen as part of a policy to re-establish control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The Panama Canal is another clear example of this.
Third, it is likely that the Trump administration is seeking to compel Iran to dismantle both its nuclear infrastructure and especially its long-range missile program. Washington may push Tehran to comply with the informal 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime’s informal limits on missile ranges and payloads, especially rockets capable of carrying nuclear payloads (500kg and 300 km range).
Tehran fears that any loss of retaliatory capability, despite its evident deterrent weakness opposite Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal, would permit future attacks on Iran, particularly by Israel alone. U.S. ordnance deliveries to Israel continue: by April 12, 25 US C-17 military transports have landed at Navatim base. A recent joint US-Israeli exercise, which simulated another missile attack by Tehran on an Israeli air base, is evidence of close cooperation. Even a minor Israeli drone strike is likely to lead to domestic pressure for Tehran to repudiate the agreement.
Even in the event of a successfully concluded agreement between Washington and Tehran, its durability will be proportional to its relative fairness in the eyes of Iran, and the persistent weight of continued compellent threats from Washington. Iran’s loss of its Syrian ally, the neutralization of Hamas and Hezbollah, its limited influence in Iraq, are offset by the facility with which Yemen can be reactivated in support of Tehran’s goals. Apart from Israel’s persistent dissatisfaction, and the lack of consensus and unanimity within the Trump administration on his Iran policy, hardliners in Iran are also skeptical of the good faith of any pact with Washington. Without the backing of Moscow, Iran does not have confidence in its ability to resist a sustained US bombardment.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
