Table of Contents
Joshua Riley
Joshua Riley is the leader of Sovereign, a New Zealand political movement. He presented oral and written submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the NZ-India FTA in May 2026. He has lodged Official Information Act requests with the Prime Minister’s Office, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, and the Ministry of Defence. Authorised by A Riley, Lvl 2, 40 Lady Elizabeth Ln, Wellington.
Five days after the parliamentary majority for ratification was already locked in, New Zealand released the full text of its Free Trade Agreement with India.
Read it. Because what it says is not what you were told.
The agreement excludes New Zealand’s largest export. Its economic gain is negligible. It opens immigration pathways that no future government can close. It commits New Zealand to an investment target it cannot meet, enforceable by a clawback it cannot challenge. It requires New Zealand to fund the development of its own competitors in its most valuable export products. And a constitutional commitment on indigenous rights was ‘affirmed’, contradicting the coalition agreement between National and New Zealand First.
Every claim in this article is referenced to a specific article, annex, or public data source.
1. The 0.07 per cent deal
The government’s own commissioned modelling – the Motu Economic Impact Assessment, finalised in March 2026 – projects the FTA will increase New Zealand’s GDP by 0.07 per cent by 2037.
That is NZ$401 million a year, after 12 years. The government borrows more than that every 12 days.
That is the upside. Here is what the model leaves out: it does not account for the immigration pathways the agreement creates. It does not model the cost of the Article 9.10 tariff clawback. It does not model the perpetual competitive impact of transferring horticultural technology to India. It does not model the opportunity cost of channelling US$20 billion into Indian investment instead of New Zealand investment. It assumes full employment and perfect labour mobility.
The model also ignores remittance outflows. India is the world’s largest remittance recipient – US$137 billion in 2024 alone (World Bank). The World Bank specifically identifies New Zealand as a growing source country. Every worker who enters through the FTA’s uncapped visa pathways and sends money home reduces the domestic GDP benefit the model projects. The Motu report does not model this.
2. What New Zealand did not get
Dairy – excluded. New Zealand’s largest export, shut out entirely. Fonterra called it “disappointing”. That is diplomatic language for worthless.
Red meat – split. Sheepmeat (lamb and mutton, HS 0204) is duty-free from day one – among the best treatment in the entire schedule, and listed by the government itself among the day-one gains. But beef (HS 0201 and 0202) is excluded entirely, as are goat meat and most offal. So the category is genuinely partial: the red meat New Zealand can realistically sell into a market that restricts beef is liberalised immediately, while beef itself is shut out.
Wine – only the expensive bottles. Tariff cuts apply only above US$5 per 750ml bottle. New Zealand's average bottled wine export price is approximately US$4.56 per bottle – below the threshold. Bulk wine, which accounts for nearly half of all export volume, averages just US$2.15. The tariff relief applies to premium exports only. The volume-leading categories are locked out. Beer stays at 110 per cent. Cider at 150 per cent.
India got everything on day one. The Indian Government’s own factsheet: 100 per cent duty-free access for Indian merchandise exports to New Zealand from day one. By the government’s own figures – measured as a share of New Zealand’s exports by value – about 57 per cent will be duty-free from day one, rising to 82 per cent when fully implemented. Counted by tariff line rather than by export value, the picture is starker: only about 30 per cent of India’s tariff lines are eliminated on day one and roughly two-thirds are ever eliminated, with close to 30 per cent excluded outright.
New Zealand’s largest export is shut out entirely, and its second-largest is half excluded. India’s exports receive full access immediately. That is the trade deal National, Labour and ACT have committed to ratifying in September.
3. The immigration architecture
You have been told about a “5,000 visa cap”. It exists, in Annex 8L. It is one pathway. It is not the main game.
The main game is uncapped. And it is permanent.
The uncapped specialist visa
Annex 8K Section B allows unlimited Intra-Corporate Transferees – executives, managers, and ‘specialists’ – from Indian companies to enter New Zealand. Three-year stays. No numerical cap for a nation of 1.47B. No labour market test. No economic needs test. For specialists, no minimum prior employment requirement. This when Luxon himself has referred to a looming ‘technological disruption’ to the labour market – McKinsey Global Institute has estimated that 30 per cent of work tasks will be automated by 2030.
What qualifies as a ‘commercial presence’ to trigger these visa rights? Article 8.1(b): a branch office or representative office. Not a factory. Not an employer of New Zealanders. An office.
The uncapped student visa
Annex 8F, paragraph 2: “Neither Party shall impose any numerical limits on the admission and entry of students from the other Party.”
Post-study work rights are locked in by treaty: two years for bachelor's graduates, three for master's, four for doctoral. The UK, Canada, and Australia are all tightening these settings. New Zealand just bound itself to maintain the opposite.
Why no future government can fix this
Article 8C.3, paragraph 4, prohibits New Zealand from imposing caps or labour market tests on these categories. New Zealand reserved an economic needs test for Contractual Services Suppliers in Section D of the same schedule – proving it knew how to reserve protections. For Intra-Corporate Transferees and students, it chose not to.
Article 8C.2(3) adds a second lock: New Zealand retains the right to regulate immigration, but those measures must not “nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the other Party.” Any domestic restriction targeting Indian nationals in the FTA visa categories – even one framed as a general policy change – can be challenged as a treaty breach.
We know what this architecture produces
The UK MAC documented the results: 97 per cent of contractor ICT visas went to Indian nationals. Four firms – TCS, Cognizant, Wipro, Infosys – held 53 per cent of all contractor visas. Salaries clustered at the minimum threshold, consistent with the threshold operating as a wage cap, not a market price. In the US, Infosys was fined US$35 million for visa fraud.
This is documented international exploitation. New Zealand has signed up for the same thing.
The pipeline to permanent residence
The three-year Specialist visa does not just provide temporary entry. It unlocks permanent residence and voting rights: 60.5 per cent of respondents to a 2023 Indian Newslink poll said they intended to vote for National – this represents a ~2x greater support for National over the general population.
The temporary visa is the door. Permanent residence is the destination. The door is ripped from its hinges and treaty-bound.
The credential gap
In June 2025, the government removed NZQA qualification assessment for Indian degrees from approved institutions – at the same time it was opening uncapped visa pathways to a country where a recent major US investigation uncovered 100,000 counterfeit degree certificates and India visa fraud in 90 per cent of cases investigated.
The NZQA safeguard is removed at a moment it is most needed.
Worse than the H-1B
The US H-1B visa is widely considered broken. The NZ Specialist visa is worse on every measure. The H-1B is capped; the NZ visa is not. The H-1B requires a wage floor; the NZ visa does not. The H-1B requires a degree; the NZ visa requires no prior employment. The H-1B can be reformed by Congress tomorrow; the NZ visa is locked into international law.
The US can fix its problem. New Zealand ceded the sovereignty needed to fix ours to India.
4. The US$20 billion trap
Ministers call this “aspirational”. Read Article 9.10.
Article 9.2 commits New Zealand to promote US$20 billion in FDI into India within 15 years. Article 9.10 says that if India considers the target unmet, India may — “notwithstanding any other provision under this Agreement” — unilaterally claw back New Zealand's tariff concessions. Article 9.11 excludes our ability to dispute this.
India judges whether New Zealand has complied. India decides the penalty. New Zealand has no recourse to arbitration.
“Notwithstanding any other provision” is the strongest override clause in the agreement. That is not aspiration. That is enforcement on terms India controls.
The target is impossible
New Zealand’s total accumulated outward FDI to every country on earth – built over decades – is US$15.95 billion. It has been falling every year since 2020. New Zealand firms have been net divestors from overseas in three of the last four years.
The treaty asks for more than the entire stock, directed to one country, in 15 years.
Australia, with an economy six times the size of New Zealand’s, has accumulated just US$1.52 billion in FDI in India over 25 years. Even with Australia’s own FTA in force, its annual FDI into India runs at approximately US$400 million. At a proportionate rate, New Zealand would need roughly 300 years to invest what National promised to promote into India in 15.
There is no reciprocal obligation
India has no FDI commitment to New Zealand. Zero. The obligation is entirely one-way.
The scale of what New Zealand has accepted: US$20 billion is 7.7 per cent of GDP. The equivalent commitment from India to New Zealand would be approximately US$300 billion – nearly four times India’s entire annual defence budget. India would never accept that. New Zealand did.
The trap closes either way
If New Zealand firms invest the US$20 billion, that capital leaves New Zealand. If they don’t, India claws back the tariff concessions.
Either way, New Zealand loses.
And India can claw back the tariff concessions – but it will not claw back 15 years of uncapped immigration.
5. Training our own competitors
This is the provision that should keep every New Zealand grower awake at night.
Annex 14A and Annex 2B require New Zealand to fund centres of excellence in India for kiwifruit and apples. To facilitate the exchange of horticultural planting materials and high-yield varieties (Article 14A.3(2)(c)) – though this is conditional, requiring agreement, completion of plant-quarantine formalities, and “relevant intellectual property protection in India and in New Zealand”. (A separate provision, Article 14A.5(h), covers the exchange of livestock germplasm and breeding materials, “subject to” each country’s domestic laws). To improve Indian rootstock (Article 14A.3(5)).
To help India build the intellectual property and plant-variety-rights framework that would “enable introduction of high-value, globally developed intellectual property protected plant varieties into India” (Article 14A.3(5)(b)) – the category into which New Zealand’s protected cultivars, such as Rockit, Dazzle and SunGold, would fall. To upgrade Indian packhouses and cold-chain infrastructure. To support Indian mānuka honey production – including establishing a centre of excellence for honey research in India, transferring hive management and breeding expertise, and setting up pilot apiaries using NZ beekeeping practices (Article 14A.4).
In return: a 45,000-tonne quota for apples (11 per cent of current exports) and a 15,000-tonne quota for kiwifruit (2 per cent). India can suspend that access if it decides New Zealand has underdelivered (Annex 2B, paragraph 9). The spending does not count toward the US$20 billion FDI target (Annex 2B, paragraph 4). New Zealand pays twice. India can rescind both.
And here is the asymmetry that should concern every grower in the country: the IP transfer is permanent. Once cultivars, germplasm, and growing expertise are in India, they cannot be recalled. But the market access is conditional — India can suspend or cancel it at any time. If the treaty collapses, India keeps everything New Zealand transferred. New Zealand gives away permanent assets in exchange for temporary, cancellable access.
Professor Jane Kelsey told the select committee she was reminded of “a previous occasion when there was a New Zealand export award to exporters of the kiwifruit stock to Chile, which then meant that Chile ended up being a major competitor, not only in Chile, but internationally”.
Danielle Adsett of New Zealand Apples and Pears admitted at the same hearings that genetic IP transfer could happen under the action plans. The precedent is not hypothetical. New Zealand developed the Hayward kiwifruit cultivar but never protected it. It spread globally. Chile built an industry on it and became a major southern hemisphere competitor. In 2016, SunGold cuttings were smuggled to China. There are now over 8,000 hectares of illegal plantings producing approximately $1 billion worth of pirated fruit, while New Zealand growers pay $270,000 per hectare to grow what China stole for free. The India FTA takes the next step: it requires the transfer by treaty.
The growers of Hawke’s Bay, Nelson, and the Bay of Plenty are being asked by their own government to subsidise the development of their future competitor who is geographically positioned better than us to deliver to our export consumers. India’s lower wages, at one-thirty-fifth of NZ’s, mean even greater competitive advantage. The National Interest Analysis does not mention these risks.
6. UNDRIP: the clause nobody can explain
Article 13.2 affirms the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Not “notes”. Affirms. The UK and EU FTAs used “note”. The India FTA escalated to “affirm” – a legally significant change.
India understood the risk. India insisted on an express reservation: its domestic legal classification of indigenous peoples would not be affected.
New Zealand lodged no standalone footnote reservation of the kind India secured. Despite the coalition agreement with New Zealand First explicitly stating that the Government “does not recognise the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as having any binding legal effect on New Zealand”.
UNDRIP on its own is non-binding. If parliament ratifies the FTA, courts can point to that ratification as evidence parliament endorsed the declaration.
Gary Judd KC, a senior Auckland barrister, put it directly: the government “has confirmed that UNDRIP has binding status – for that’s the meaning of ‘affirm’ in legal parlance”. And the position being affirmed is New Zealand’s most recent formal statement on the declaration – its 21 July 2023 statement to the UN that “Aotearoa New Zealand is committed to upholding the rights affirmed in the declaration”. The coalition government has since stopped progressing a declaration plan, but it has never formally withdrawn that statement of support – which, on Judd’s reading, is the position the FTA now affirms.
The trade minister says he does not know how this clause got into the agreement. India’s reservation proves it was negotiated. Someone agreed to this on New Zealand’s behalf.
7. CBDC: the commitment nobody debated
Article 8A.14(j) commits New Zealand and India to “engage in an in-depth study, design and implementation of central bank digital currency (CBDC) in both retail and cross-border payments area”.
Read that again. Not study. Study, design, and implementation. Retail CBDC means a government-issued digital currency used by ordinary consumers for everyday transactions. Cross-border CBDC means a digital payments rail between New Zealand and India.
Central bank digital currencies are among the most contested monetary policy proposals in the developed world. They raise fundamental questions about financial surveillance, programmable money, and the ability of governments to monitor or restrict how citizens spend. Multiple jurisdictions have debated CBDC proposals publicly, with significant opposition. New Zealand has had no such debate.
Yet the commitment is in the treaty. Buried in a financial services annex – Article 8A.14 of Annex 8A – alongside nine other cooperation objectives.
The FTA also commits both parties to develop Real Time Payments infrastructure for cross-border remittances and integrate Fast Payment Systems for real-time cross-border merchant payments (Article 8A.11, paragraph 4). Combined with the CBDC commitment, this amounts to a comprehensive digital payments integration programme between New Zealand and India – agreed inside a trade agreement, without a public mandate.
8. What ministers told the public – and what the text says
The public case for this agreement has been built on ministerial statements that are directly contradicted by the treaty text.
“It categorically does not”
Asked in parliament whether the FTA gives rights of migration or immigration to Indian nationals, Trade Minister Todd McClay answered: “No, it categorically does not.” He told RNZ the commitment was for 1,667 high-skilled temporary visas per year, and “at the end of that period, they have to leave, they can’t stay on, there’s no migration, there’s no rights to citizenship”.
The text: Annex 8K Section B creates an uncapped Intra-Corporate Transferee pathway – separate from the 1,667 TEE visas – with no numerical limit, no labour market test, and three-year stays. Annex 8F prohibits numerical limits on students and locks in post-study work visas of up to four years. Both pathways feed directly into existing domestic residence pathways. McClay’s statement described one pathway and omitted the others.
“Future governments can change the settings”
McClay told parliament: “The FTA does not restrict the ability for future and current governments to modify work visas or student policies or settings.” He also stated: “It does not remove a cap on the number of students who can come to New Zealand, because there is not a cap. But it also does not restrict future governments from creating a cap should they wish to.”
The text: Article 8C.3, paragraph 4, prohibits New Zealand from imposing numerical limits or labour market tests on the scheduled work categories, and Annex 8F, paragraph 2, prohibits any numerical limit on students. Article 8C.2(3) prohibits measures that would “nullify or impair the benefits” of the immigration commitments.
“Targeted at critical skill shortages, including doctors”
The Beehive press release, issued in McClay’s name, stated: “These temporary visas will focus on priority jobs where New Zealand has skills shortages, including doctors, nurses, teachers, ICT and engineering.”
The text: The Annex 8K Specialist visa requires no proof of skills shortage, no labour market test, and no economic needs test. Article 8C.3(4) explicitly prohibits these tests. The word “doctors” does not appear in the treaty. The press release framed uncapped, untested visa pathways as if they were targeted at verified skill shortages. They are not.
“There was nothing about partners”
McClay told RNZ that “there was nothing in the agreement about partners, spouses and children being allowed for someone on a TEE visa”. Winston Peters countered that the 5,000 cap does not include family members. “You go from saying it is one child – 10,000 – to quickly possibly 25,000 or more.”
Annex 8K explicitly provides otherwise. The treaty states: “New Zealand shall allow the entry and temporary stay of the partner and any dependent children accompanying a natural person of a party that has been granted entry and temporary stay for a period of over 12 months under this annex.” The stay duration matches the primary visa holder’s. “Partner” is defined to include any spouse, civil partner, or unmarried partner. On its own terms – a statement specifically about TEE visas – McClay's claim is defensible, because the TEE schedule itself says nothing about partners. But it was narrowly framed: the treaty plainly does provide for partners and dependent children elsewhere (Annex 8K), and family members of TEE-visa holders could still enter under New Zealand’s general immigration settings – which was Peters' actual point.
“We are telling the truth”
Prime Minister Luxon, asked about the contradictions between his ministers and the treaty text, told RNZ: “We are telling the truth and we’ve been very clear on the immigration components.”
Even Labour leader Chris Hipkins, who had conditionally supported the deal, told RNZ that MFAT briefing notes on what the agreement actually said “appeared to contradict McClay’s statements.” Hipkins said he could not “hand-on-heart give a definitive answer” on whether future governments could cap student numbers.
The Indian Government was more direct. Its official characterisation of the deal: “unprecedented student mobility and post-study opportunities”. The Indian commerce minister and Indian prime minister both described the immigration provisions in terms New Zealand's own ministers refused to use publicly.
The NZQA decision nobody announced
In June 2025, Immigration Minister Erica Stanford's portfolio removed the NZQA International Qualification Assessment requirement for Indian degrees from approved institutions – at the same time the government was negotiating uncapped visa pathways to India, and months after a major US investigation had uncovered 100,000 counterfeit Indian degree certificates.
Winston Peters was right
New Zealand First leader Winston Peters described the agreement as “substantially an immigration deal” and said his party would vote against it. He was publicly contradicted by his own prime minister and trade minister. The treaty text vindicates Peters on every contested point: the pathways are uncapped, future governments cannot impose caps without breaching international obligations, family members can accompany visa holders under existing settings, and the Indian Government’s own description of the deal – “unprecedented” – was more accurate than anything said by Luxon or McClay.
9. The fait accompli
The dates are public.
December 2025: Negotiations concluded. No text released.
23 April 2026: Parliamentary majority secured.
30 April 2026: Public submissions open.
This is not an accident. Academic research by Thomas Riley (Public Interest Law Journal of New Zealand, 2018) found that no select committee treaty-examination report has ever been formally debated in the House of Representatives. Each report sat on the order paper for 15 days and expired without discussion. Three-quarters of FADT Committee reports were two pages or fewer. The process provides the appearance of democratic scrutiny without the substance.
New Zealand is the only major Westminster jurisdiction without a permanent, independent body charged with scrutinising trade treaties during negotiation.
This agreement runs counter to New Zealand’s economic and immigration interests and surrenders some aspects of national sovereignty. It should not be ratified as written in September. The public needs to be educated on what National, Labour and ACT are doing to NZ through the India FTA.
The New Zealand First Wanganui Committee has tabled a remit to establish a permanent independent trade scrutiny body with statutory authority to publish independent analysis during negotiation, receive public submissions on negotiating mandates, and report directly to parliament. Critically, the body’s report on any treaty would have to be debated and voted on by parliament before ratification – and where the body identifies provisions that cede sovereign regulatory authority, ratification would require a two-thirds supermajority.
This article was published by RCR Media.
