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Mark Schwartz
Lieutenant General Mark Schwartz (US Army, ret) is a 33-year veteran of the US Army who has led teams at JSOC and SOCOM-Europe. He is former commander of US Army Security Assistance Command.
The contest for critical minerals is the defining industrial and security challenge of the 21st century. As a former US Army general, I see daily how urgently America must regain control over the materials that underpin both its prosperity and defense.
For decades, the People’s Republic of China has executed a disciplined strategy to dominate global supply chains for critical minerals such as antimony, graphite, lithium, cobalt, and more. Through state-backed capital, below-market pricing, an expansive acquisition campaign, and outright coercion, Beijing has built systemic chokepoints that reach from Africa to Southeast Asia. Recent moves to acquire Tanzania’s rare earth assets are the latest reminder of how swiftly promising Western opportunities can slip into Chinese control when the United States and its allies hesitate.
The United States remains acutely dependent on foreign sources for the materials that make fighter jets, munitions, semiconductors, batteries, and next-generation energy systems possible. That dependence is not simply economic, it is strategic vulnerability that China uses for leverage to the detriment of US national interests.
Adversaries understand that supply interruptions, export controls, and price manipulation are tools of geopolitical influence. America must treat this as a national security priority equal to traditional defense modernization, such as President Trump’s recent call to increase the defense budget by 50 per cent.
Industrial sovereignty depends on increasing extraction of critical minerals in the US, developing the talent and innovative processing technologies to refine critical minerals, and working together with our allies.
That’s where partnership with Australia becomes critical. As one of America’s most trusted allies, Australia possesses vast reserves of the minerals required for advanced manufacturing. When Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met with President Donald Trump, the two governments reaffirmed a landmark US–Australia Critical Minerals Framework – aligning investment, offtake, and technology cooperation to reduce global dependence on Chinese refining.
That framework is now moving from policy to practice. This year, Locksley Resources, a mining company based in Perth, Australia, produced the first 100 per cent American-made antimony ingot in decades. It is sourced entirely from their Mojave Desert mine in California and refined domestically through an innovative, low-emission process developed in partnership with Rice University in Houston. Antimony may not be a household name, but it is indispensable to America’s defense and technology base. It is used in munitions, semiconductors, fire retardants, solar panels, and advanced battery systems.
Reestablishing a fully domestic, mine-to-metal antimony supply chain was once deemed impossible. The US hadn’t produced refined antimony since the 1970s. But through Australian mining expertise, American scientific innovation, and US government financial support, such as the Export-Import Bank’s recent Letter of Interest for up to $191 million, they are helping rebuild a capability essential to both national security and economic resilience.
The implications extend far beyond antimony. The United States and Australia can together create a model for how democratic allies rebuild supply chains, linking upstream mining to downstream processing and advanced materials research. By integrating these efforts, we can power defense systems, enable clean-energy infrastructure, and secure industrial competitiveness.
But time is not on our side. Each month of delay allows China to deepen its control of critical inputs. Without accelerated development, more promising deposits will fall into Beijing’s orbit, and Western manufacturers will face higher costs, constrained access, and reduced readiness.
To change course, the United States must act decisively.
First, we must modernize permitting and financing to accelerate responsible domestic production. Congress has considered permitting reform for years and members of Congress from both parties are interested in specific policies that can improve America’s critical minerals position. This is the year for Congress to put forth a bipartisan package that streamlines permitting and regulatory processes for critical minerals extraction and refining.
Second, we must integrate allied supply chains, beginning with Australia, to ensure secure offtake and transparent standards. Australia is the global leader in mining talent and technology. Working together, we can leverage America’s economic might and the experience of leading of Australian companies to create closed-loop extraction and refining systems that degrade Beijing’s leverage.
Third, we must expand refining and manufacturing capacity so critical minerals are processed and finished in the US and allied nations, not reimported from competitors. The Chinese Communist Party doesn’t care about the environmental downsides of crude extraction and refining techniques. The United States is different. The effect extraction and refining have on local populations and environmental resources matters, and technologies like the green extraction and storage techniques being developed at Rice University will benefit the entire industry.
In this new era of strategic competition, the nations that control the inputs will shape the outcomes. Democracies must lead, not just through words and agreements, but through industrial action that matches our strategic intent.
The US–Australia partnership offers the model. If we seize this moment, we will ensure that the materials of modern life are sourced, processed, and refined under the stewardship of free nations. If we do not, we risk ceding the foundations of our prosperity and defense to those who would use them as leverage.
The stakes could not be higher for our economies, our militaries, and the free world itself.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
