Greg Bouwer
IINZ
Introduction
The recent proactive release of MFAT’s advice to the government on the question of recognising “Palestine” has revealed something more significant than just a policy disagreement. It has exposed a deep structural bias within New Zealand’s foreign-affairs bureaucracy – a worldview that assigns blame for the failure of the two-state solution almost entirely to Israel, while treating the Palestinian and broader Arab agency as either irrelevant or politically inconvenient.
This pattern is not new. But for the first time, it is visible in black and white, inside official papers.
For years, New Zealand’s diplomatic establishment has promoted a narrative that the two-state solution is being ‘extinguished’ primarily or exclusively by Israel. This was evident again in the MFAT draft cabinet paper advising New Zealand to recognise a Palestinian state – without any security roadmap, credible governance structure, or evidence of Palestinian institutional readiness.
Yet what is conspicuously missing from all of the released material – and from decades of New Zealand commentary – is any acknowledgement that Palestinian institutions, factions, and regional Arab governments have systematically undermined the same two-state solution MFAT claims to defend.
The absence is so total it raises the question: Has MFAT ever analysed Palestinian or Arab responsibility at all?
The available evidence suggests the answer may be ‘no’.
MFAT’s Papers: Israel Alone Is Blamed
The core MFAT argument for recognising a Palestinian state rested on one claim:
“Israel’s actions are rapidly extinguishing any prospect of realising a two-state solution.”¹
Nowhere does MFAT present:
- an assessment of Hamas’s open rejection of a two-state framework;
- an analysis of Palestinian Authority corruption, repression, or refusal to negotiate since 2008;
- a review of Abbas’s repeated statements that he will “never” accept a Jewish state;
- or a discussion of Arab states – particularly Iran and Qatar – who actively bankroll actors opposed to peace.
This is not analysis. It is a narrative.
MFAT’s framing assumes that Palestinian and Arab actors are passive victims, not independent decision-makers whose strategic choices have repeatedly derailed progress.
The implication is clear: New Zealand’s foreign-policy bureaucracy views the conflict as a one-sided moral drama rather than a complex political reality.
What MFAT Never Mentions: The Arab and Palestinian Record
Any serious assessment of the two-state solution must reckon with the past 30 years:
1. The Palestinian Authority has rejected multiple statehood offers.
There have been at least four offers of statehood that have been outright rejected by Palestinian leaders:
- 2000 Camp David
- 2001 Taba
- 2008 Olmert offer
- 2014 Kerry framework
Each would have created a Palestinian state on at least 95 per cent of Judea & Samaria (the so-called “West Bank”) with land swaps and East Jerusalem as the capital. Arafat and Abbas walked away from every one without any counter-offer.
This is nowhere in MFAT’s papers.
2. The PA openly rejects the legitimacy of a Jewish state.
Mahmoud Abbas has stated repeatedly:
“I will never accept a Jewish state.”²
Rejecting the fundamental premise of two states is a major obstacle – one MFAT simply ignores.
3. Hamas’s entire political programme is the destruction of Israel, not coexistence.
Hamas leaders have said plainly:
“We will never accept a two-state solution.”³
They do not hide this. MFAT hides it for them.
4. Regional Arab governments have historically opposed Palestinian statehood unless it weakens Israel.
From 1947 onward, Arab regimes consistently rejected partition because it entailed accepting a Jewish state.
This historical record has never appeared in a New Zealand foreign-policy document.
5. Palestinian governance institutions are neither democratic nor capable of running a state.
The PA has not held elections since 2006. Hamas rules Gaza by force. Corruption, human rights violations, and political repression are endemic.
MFAT’s papers present none of this.
The Institutional Explanation: Ideology, Not Intelligence
Why does MFAT consistently omit Palestinian and Arab agency?
A likely explanation is that New Zealand’s diplomatic bureaucracy has internalised a particular intellectual framework:
- Israel is the powerful party, therefore Israel holds all responsibility.
- Palestinians are the weaker party, therefore they lack agency.
- Arab states are ‘regional actors’, not direct players, so their actions are treated as secondary.
- Any acknowledgement of Palestinian or Arab responsibility risks complicating a clean moral narrative.
This is a worldview rooted not in strategic analysis but in a post-colonial ideological lens that divides conflicts into ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’. It is a moral binary, not a foreign-policy method.
The result is predictable:When Israel errs, MFAT attributes causality. When Palestinians err, MFAT attributes context. When Arab states interfere, MFAT says nothing.
This is not neutrality. It is bias.
Why This Matters for New Zealand
Foreign-policy analysis that systematically ignores one party’s agency is not just academically flawed – it produces misinformed policy decisions.
Recognising a Palestinian state without requiring:
- unified governance,
- renunciation of terrorism,
- defined borders,
- democratic institutions,
- or security guarantees
is not support for peace. It is support for fantasy.
MFAT’s one-sided framing encourages precisely that fantasy.
If New Zealand is to play any constructive role in promoting peace, it must adopt what MFAT avoided:
- clear requirements for Palestinian governance,
- accountability for Hamas and rejectionist factions,
- recognition of Arab state interference,
- and an honest appraisal of past Palestinian decisions that foreclosed peace opportunities.
Until then, New Zealand’s foreign policy will remain an echo of outdated talking points rather than a platform for genuine diplomatic engagement.
Conclusion
The proactive release of MFAT’s internal advice does not merely show disagreement between officials and ministers. It exposes a structural analytical flaw:
MFAT appears to have never undertaken serious consideration of how Palestinian, Hamas, or Arab actions have undermined the two-state solution.
There is no evidence in the papers that such analysis has ever been produced.
If this absence reflects the totality of MFAT’s internal work, then New Zealand foreign policy is operating with a blind spot large enough to distort the very concept of peace.
For the sake of an informed national debate, that must change.
References
- MFAT Draft Cabinet Paper (16 August 2024), proactive release, p 2.
- Mahmoud Abbas, public statements 2011–2023 (multiple sources).
- Statements from senior Hamas leaders including Khaled Mashal and Yahya Sinwar, 2012–2023.
This article was originally published by the Israel Institute of New Zealand.
