Stephen Hay and Claude AI

This is the fourth paper in a series. Paper One (New Zealand’s Diesel Supply) examined the domestic reserve position and economic consequences. Paper Two (New Zealand’s Broken Supply Chain) examined the geopolitical and logistical constraints on replacement supply. Paper Three (How the World Lost Its Refining Buffer, 25 March) traced the structural history of global refining capacity destruction.
This paper synthesises developments through 25 March 2026, introduces new data on New Zealand’s import terminal network, and examines the full spectrum of affected fuels – extending the analysis beyond diesel to jet fuel and LPG. Two critical decision points – South Korea’s export policy review and updated MBIE stock data – are expected on Friday 27 March and will materially affect the outlook described here.
Paper Five (This is the Wrong Map) asked why New Zealand keeps reaching for the wrong analytical tools, and what does that tell us about the thinking that produced the crisis in the first place?

[Ed’s note: this paper is out of order with the others. Some details may be outdated now. We apologise.]

Executive Summary

The three preceding papers in this series established that New Zealand faces a credible risk of fuel depletion in late April to early May 2026, arising from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the consequent reduction in Asian refinery output, South Korea’s export restrictions, and a domestic regulatory framework calibrated for normal times rather than disrupted ones.

This paper adds a dimension that the preceding analysis has not fully examined: New Zealand’s fuel supply chain is not a reserve. It is a conveyor belt. The country’s entire fuel security rests on the arrival of approximately four to five tankers per week across all import terminals. That is the number required simply to match daily consumption. Below four arrivals per week, onshore stocks deplete. Below three, the depletion becomes measurable and rapid.

As at 22 March 2026, MBIE’s own published data confirms two vessels scheduled for the following fortnight – one per week, against the four required to break even. Onshore diesel has already fallen to 18.1 days, below the 21-day Minimum Stockholding Obligation threshold for physical in-country stock. Jet fuel onshore stands at 20.1 days, below its 24-day MSO. Petrol, at 24.5 days, is also below its minimum of 28 days holdings.

This paper also documents the widening of the crisis beyond diesel: jet fuel crack spreads have risen from approximately US$22 to US$115 per barrel; QatarEnergy has declared force majeure on LNG and associated products, including LPG and naphtha, following missile strikes on the Ras Laffan production complex; Philippine President Marcos has warned publicly that long-haul aviation faces grounding risk from jet fuel unavailability at destination airports, and South Korea’s naphtha restrictions have pushed petrochemical inventories to approximately two weeks.

Two events on Friday 27 March will materially shape the fifth paper in this series: South Korea’s review of its 13 March export cap decision (which may result in an outright ban), and updated MBIE stock figures. If both move in the adverse direction, the late-April depletion scenario described in Paper One becomes not a risk but a near-certainty.

New Zealand does not have a fuel reserve. It has a conveyor belt. And the conveyor belt is running at half speed.

1. The Conveyor Belt: New Zealand’s Import Architecture

1.1 The terminal network

New Zealand’s fuel import infrastructure consists of 10 import terminals and two inland distribution hubs. The primary terminals are Marsden Point (Northland), Port of Tauranga (Bay of Plenty), CentrePort Wellington, and Lyttelton (Canterbury). Secondary terminals operate at Napier, New Plymouth, Nelson, Timaru, Dunedin and Bluff.

Marsden Point, operated by Channel Infrastructure, is the only deep-water terminal capable of receiving the largest refined product carriers – LR2 class vessels carrying up to 120 million litres. It handles approximately 3.5 billion litres annually (40 per cent of national fuel demand and 80 per cent of jet fuel), distributed in part via a 170-kilometre pipeline to the Wiri inland terminal in South Auckland, which in turn supplies Auckland International Airport.

The regional terminals receive medium-range tankers carrying 40–50 million litres. Channel Infrastructure’s published data shows Marsden Point received 51 vessel calls in FY25, down from 70 in FY23, with throughput holding steady because vessels have grown larger. This gives a Marsden Point baseline of approximately one large vessel per week.

The remaining 5.5–5.7 billion litres of national annual consumption – roughly 60 per cent of the total – arrives through the nine other terminals. Based on vessel capacity and throughput estimates, this implies approximately three to four medium vessel calls per week across the regional network, producing a national total of approximately four to five tanker arrivals per week in normal operations.

1.2 The arithmetic of the conveyor belt

New Zealand’s total fuel consumption across all types is approximately 9.2 billion litres annually, or 25 million litres per day. At four to five vessel arrivals per week carrying an average of 40–70 million litres each, the system delivers just enough to match consumption – with the Minimum Stockholding Obligation providing the buffer for disruption.

The confirmed pipeline for the fortnight of 23 March to 5 April is two vessels – one per week. This is the conveyor belt running at approximately one-quarter of its normal rate for confirmed shipments.

1.3 The diesel calculation

Diesel warrants specific analysis, given its economic centrality, established in Papers One and Two. National diesel consumption is 3.72 billion litres annually, or approximately 10.2 million litres per day. Marsden Point handles approximately 1.09 billion litres of diesel annually (29 percent of the national total), with the balance arriving through the regional terminal network.

At 10.2 million litres daily consumption and 21 days of MSO minimum:

•       Physical diesel stock required to meet MSO: approximately 214 million litres onshore

•       Onshore diesel as at 22 March: 18.1 days (approximately 185 million litres) – already below MSO minimum

•       Each missed MR vessel call (40–50 million litres diesel component): approximately 2–4 days of national diesel supply

•       At confirmed arrival rate of one vessel per week carrying diesel: net depletion of approximately five to seven days of diesel cover per week

Projecting from 18.1 days onshore diesel on 22 March, at the confirmed two-vessel fortnight rate: onshore diesel cover may fall to approximately 11 days by 5 April – before any unconfirmed vessels are counted. The 21-day MSO minimum, already breached for onshore stock, would then be approximately double the physical onshore holding.

The gap between ‘46 days total cover’ and ‘18 days diesel onshore’ is not a nuance in communications. It is the difference between a policy position and an operational reality.

1.4 The MSO and what ‘on-water’ actually means

The government’s public position – repeated in parliament on 25 March – is that total combined fuel cover stands at 46.6 days. This figure includes on-water stocks of 25.9 days combined. The framing is technically accurate and practically misleading in three respects.

First, on-water stock can be met under the MSO with vessels within the Exclusive Economic Zone – meaning a tanker 200 nautical miles offshore in adverse weather technically satisfies the regulatory requirement while being days from usability. Second, on-water stock is only as reliable as the shipping schedule behind it: the MBIE data explicitly states that its two-week pipeline ‘does not include shipments more than two weeks away, including cargoes already loaded, currently loading or planned.’ Third, and most critically: the counted on-water diesel is 28.3 days of cover, but the confirmed vessels arriving in the next fortnight deliver only 7.2 days of diesel. The remainder of the ‘on-water’ figure represents vessels not yet confirmed in the two-week pipeline.

Shane Jones’ description of New Zealand’s position as ‘within spitting distance of 50 days’ is an accurate description of the total figure including on-water. It is not an accurate description of the fuel New Zealand can physically use today.

2. The Full Fuel Spectrum: Beyond Diesel

The preceding papers in this series focused primarily on diesel, for sound reasons: it is the foundation fuel of the economy, its depletion cascades immediately through freight, agriculture and construction, and its MSO was set at the lowest level of the three main fuel types. Papers Two and Three introduced the middle distillates argument – that diesel, jet fuel and kerosene are the same refinery output expressing itself in different specifications. This section develops that argument with current data across the full fuel spectrum.

2.1 Jet fuel: the aviation crisis is the same crisis

Jet fuel (Jet A-1) is refined kerosene – chemically the same middle distillate fraction as diesel, processed to tighter specifications for altitude performance. When a refinery cuts middle distillate output, it cuts diesel and jet fuel simultaneously. South Korea’s export cap and Singapore’s reduced refinery run rates have affected both products from the same crude barrel.

The financial signal is unambiguous. Jet fuel crack spreads – the margin between crude oil and refined jet fuel, reflecting refinery scarcity – have risen from approximately US$22 per barrel before the crisis to approximately US$115 per barrel as at mid-March 2026. Air New Zealand suspended earnings guidance in response. Jet fuel in Asia and Oceania is now trading at approximately US$197 per barrel, up 12.6 per cent in a single week.

The operational signal, delivered publicly by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos in a Bloomberg interview, is more alarming than the financial data. Marcos stated that grounding of long-haul aircraft is “a distinct possibility”, noting that several countries have already told Philippine airlines they may not be able to refuel at destination airports, forcing carriers to tanker fuel for both outbound and return journeys. “Long haul is going to be a much more serious problem,” he said, citing reduced refinery output as the cause of physical jet fuel unavailability at airports, not merely price.

The New Zealand dimension is direct. Marsden Point handles approximately 80 per cent of New Zealand’s jet fuel. Jet fuel onshore as at 22 March stands at 20.1 days – below the 24-day MSO minimum. The single confirmed vessel arriving 30 March to 5 April carries 11.6 days of jet fuel, providing temporary relief, but the post-5 April pipeline is unconfirmed. If destination airports in Asia, Europe or North America are rationing jet fuel and refusing to sell to foreign carriers, Air New Zealand’s long-haul network – already under earnings pressure – faces the same operational constraints Marcos described for Philippine Airlines.

Cebu Pacific has already suspended routes to Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Vietnam Airlines and VietJet are making similar reductions. The Philippines is importing Russian crude for the first time in five years – 750,000 barrels of ESPO Blend under a US sanctions waiver valid only until 11 April – illustrating how extreme the regional supply scramble has become.

New Zealand’s air connectivity is its only non-maritime link to the world. A jet fuel crisis does not merely disrupt tourism and business travel. It isolates the country in ways that compound every other dimension of the supply crisis.

2.2 LPG: the underreported dimension

LPG – liquefied petroleum gas, primarily propane and butane – is a light-end refinery product, coming off the distillation column above naphtha and well above the middle distillates. Like jet fuel and diesel, it derives from the same crude barrel: when refineries cut throughput, LPG output falls simultaneously.

The QatarEnergy force majeure declaration of 4 March explicitly included LPG alongside LNG, naphtha, condensate and sulphur, following Iranian missile strikes on the Ras Laffan production complex on 18 and 19 March. Two LNG trains totalling 12.8 million tonnes per annum – approximately 17 per cent of Qatar’s export capacity – sustained significant damage. QatarEnergy’s CEO stated that repairs would take three to five years, with force majeure declarations on some long-term contracts for up to that period.

Qatar is the world’s largest LPG exporter. Its force majeure on LNG contracts compounds South Korean refinery output reductions affecting the same product. For New Zealand, this matters in two practical dimensions:

•       Household LPG: A significant portion of New Zealand homes – particularly rural properties and older housing stock – use LPG for cooking and heating, supplied by Rockgas and Origin from import terminals. LPG competes for the same constrained refinery output as diesel and jet fuel.

•       Agricultural LPG: LPG is widely used for crop drying, particularly grain and maize – a critical input in the April-May harvest window that Papers One and Two identified as the period of greatest agricultural diesel vulnerability. LPG shortage in that window compounds, rather than substitutes for, diesel shortage.

The public and political conversation about New Zealand’s fuel crisis has focused almost entirely on petrol prices and, more recently, diesel supply. LPG has received virtually no attention. Its supply chain runs through the same disrupted refineries and the same disrupted export regime.

2.3 Naphtha: the industrial and transition fuel problem

Naphtha sits between LPG and the middle distillates in the refinery barrel – a petrochemical feedstock used primarily in plastics, chemicals and fertiliser production. It is not a transport fuel, but its disruption has transport-relevant consequences.

South Korea’s naphtha restrictions, triggered by the same feedstock crisis affecting diesel and jet fuel production, have pushed petrochemical industry inventories to approximately two weeks. Lotte Chemical, LG Chem and Hanwha Solutions have issued force majeure notices. Naphtha crackers – the facilities that process naphtha into ethylene and propylene for plastics – face potential shutdown as early as next month.

The strategic irony is worth stating plainly. The global energy transition – the replacement of petroleum fuels with electrification – depends on critical minerals extracted by diesel-powered machinery, processed in facilities that use naphtha-derived chemicals, assembled into batteries whose components are shipped on vessels that use heavy fuel oil. A petroleum supply crisis does not merely threaten the current economy. It threatens the infrastructure of the intended replacement economy simultaneously.

3. The Upstream Picture: Developments Through 25 March

3.1 Trump’s five-day pause: diplomacy or market management?

On 23 March, President Trump shelved his 48-hour ultimatum for Iran to reopen the strait, citing ‘very good and productive conversations regarding a complete and total resolution of hostilities.’ Iran’s foreign ministry simultaneously stated there was ‘no dialogue between Tehran and Washington,’ while acknowledging regional intermediaries were active.

The five-day window expires approximately Saturday 28 March – when markets are closed. If diplomatic progress does not materialise and escalation resumes, the next market open will absorb the shock without a trading session to test the diplomatic signals in real time. For tanker operators and insurers, the pause has not changed the operational picture: approximately 10 tankers carrying 12 million barrels passed through Hormuz in the past week, against the pre-crisis norm of 250 vessels carrying 300 million barrels per week. Transit is down approximately 94 per cent and the insurance market remains functionally closed to commercial transit regardless of diplomatic announcements.

The mines dimension compounds the post-ceasefire timeline. US intelligence assessments confirm at least a dozen Iranian limpet mines in the strait. Mine clearance operations require months, regardless of when hostilities cease, and underwriters have stated they will want sustained evidence of reduced threat – not announcements – before restoring normal coverage. A ceasefire, if achieved over the weekend, would not restore tanker flows at volume for weeks, at minimum.

3.2 QatarEnergy force majeure: structural damage on a multi-year horizon

The QatarEnergy force majeure is the development with the longest tail. Iranian missile strikes on the Ras Laffan production hub on 18 and 19 March caused significant damage to two LNG trains representing approximately 17 per cent of Qatar’s export capacity. QatarEnergy’s CEO confirmed repairs will take three to five years.

Beyond LNG, the same strikes disrupted condensate, LPG, naphtha and sulphur output. Qatar is the world’s largest LNG exporter and a major LPG supplier. South Korea, which receives significant Qatari LNG and uses it as a feedstock input into the refinery complex that supplies New Zealand, faces compounded pressure: reduced Korean crude supply from Hormuz closure, and now reduced Qatari gas supply. The two disruptions are independent in cause and additive in effect.

The multi-year repair timeline means that even if the Hormuz closure resolves in weeks, global LNG markets will face a structural 17 per cent Qatari production deficit for years. The LNG price signal will remain elevated, affecting every gas-fired electricity system, including New Zealand’s own gas generation sector.

3.3 South Korea: the Friday decision

South Korea formally capped fuel exports at 2025 baseline levels on 13 March 2026. That cap is under review and a decision on whether to escalate to an outright export ban is expected Friday 27 March. The significance for New Zealand cannot be overstated: South Korea supplies approximately 38–51 per cent of New Zealand’s refined fuel imports (the range reflects different measurement periods and methodologies).

South Korean refiners advised S&P Global in early March that second-quarter term contracts could become “rather difficult” if feedstock disruption persisted beyond one to two months. That window expires in late April – precisely the depletion period identified in Paper One. The naphtha export restrictions announced separately have pushed Korean petrochemical inventories to approximately two weeks, increasing domestic political pressure for full export controls.

An export ban would not merely slow New Zealand’s supply. It would remove the primary supply pipeline at a stroke, shifting every scenario in Paper Two’s transit timeline table by four to six weeks – and making the late-April central case, not worst case.

3.4 Japan: nuclear relief and crude oil reality

Japan restarted Unit 6 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in February 2026, reaching full commercial operation around 18 March. At 1,356 MW, the reactor can displace approximately 1.3 million tonnes of LNG annually. This is welcome but does not materially alter Japan’s existential crude oil dependency: 95.1 per cent of Japanese crude imports derive from the Middle East, with 73.7 percent transported through Hormuz.

Japan began releasing 80 million barrels of oil on 16 March – the largest drawdown since the reserve system was established in 1978 – covering approximately 45 days of consumption. Only 15 of Japan’s 33 operable reactors are currently in operation, and the restart programme continues to face regulatory and local government delays. New reactors cannot be commissioned in weeks. Japan’s nuclear option reduces LNG import demand marginally: it does not address the crude oil supply crisis that affects the refineries supplying New Zealand.

3.5 The UK and the North Sea: the limits of domestic production

The UK government has maintained its position of no new North Sea exploration licences, despite intense political pressure in the context of the Hormuz closure. Analysis from Oxford’s Smith School found that even maximum North Sea extraction returned directly to households would reduce energy bills by at most £82 per year – because oil and gas is sold on international markets at international prices regardless of extraction location.

The UK position illustrates a structural truth that applies equally to New Zealand’s Marsden Point debate: domestic production decisions made today cannot affect the supply available in April or May 2026. The timeframes are incompatible. The political instinct to treat domestic resource decisions as a crisis response reflects a misunderstanding of the supply chain geometry.

3.6 ExxonMobil exits New Zealand

Newsroom confirmed on 24 March that ExxonMobil has hired Goldman Sachs to manage a likely exit from the New Zealand market. Mobil is one of New Zealand’s five fuel importers and joint venture partner in the Wiri inland terminal. A sale process in the current market environment raises questions about transition timing, counterparty interest and the continuity of Mobil’s supply contracts and terminal access during any ownership change. Neither Mobil nor BP has responded to questions on the matter.

4. Battery Minerals and the Crisis Within the Crisis

Argus Media reported on 24 March that the Middle East fuel crisis is placing immediate pressure on battery metals mining operations, particularly where activities rely heavily on diesel for haulage, transport and on-site generation. Operations in southern Africa, Australia and southeast Asia face both diesel shortage risk and price-driven cost increases.

Singapore gasoil prices have risen approximately 57 per cent since 28 February; jet fuel has surged approximately 114 per cent over the same period. The diesel supply loss from Hormuz disruption is estimated at three to four million barrels per day globally – roughly five to 12 per cent of total consumption. At these price levels and availability constraints, mines that are not priority customers or are distant from fuel hubs face genuine operational risk.

Australia’s S&P/ASX 200 Materials Index has fallen 20.3 per cent since the conflict began, with analysts flagging that some mining operations could face diesel shortages within a fortnight. Australia consumes approximately 40 per cent of its diesel in mining – directly competitive with the freight and agricultural demand that is also under pressure.

The broader implication, noted in Paper Three, bears restating: the global energy transition depends on critical minerals – lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper – extracted almost entirely by diesel-powered equipment. A prolonged petroleum crisis does not merely threaten the economy that fossil fuels currently power. It simultaneously threatens the infrastructure of the economy intended to replace it.

5. The Government’s Response: What Has and Has Not Been Done

Prime Minister Luxon confirmed in Parliament on 25 March that the government’s National Fuel Plan will be released on Friday 27 March. The plan follows a four-level framework: Level 1 (minor response) through Level 4 (severe restrictions and rationing for essential workers). No public statement has indicated which level is currently active, though the data suggests the trajectory toward Level 3 is measurable in weeks.

Confirmed measures to date include:

•       Temporary alignment with Australian fuel specifications, allowing imports meeting Australian standards for up to 12 months. New Zealand has not followed Australia in permitting higher-sulphur diesel up to 50ppm, maintaining its own quality standards.

•       A fuel crisis bailout package providing approximately $50 weekly relief to middle-income families. As noted in Paper One, this is a petrol consumption measure and does not address diesel supply.

•       Channel Infrastructure and Port Taranaki have offered idle storage capacity. The Marsden Point site holds approximately 300 million litres in current service, with an additional 350–400 million litres of idle tank capacity (formerly crude oil storage) potentially convertible to refined product. Associate Minister Shane Jones has acknowledged commissioning would take several months.

What has not been publicly confirmed includes: sector prioritisation lists for diesel allocation; upstream terminal allocation protocols; emergency procurement from alternative sources including India; conversion of IEA oil ticket obligations into physical product; or any public articulation of the threshold at which Level 3 or Level 4 protocols activate.

The 12-week internal planning horizon that Finance Minister Willis referenced in mid-March implies officials are modelling disruption extending into June. The decisions required to act on that horizon – which are expensive, politically visible and require honest public acknowledgement of the supply position – have not yet been made at the speed the arithmetic demands.

6. What Friday Will Tell Us

Two data points expected Friday 27 March will materially reshape the analysis in this paper. They represent a genuine fork in the road for New Zealand’s supply outlook.

6.1 South Korea’s export policy decision

6.2 Updated MBIE stock figures

The MBIE data published Wednesday 25 March (covering stocks as at Monday 23 March) will be the most closely watched weekly release since the crisis began. The trajectory from Paper One’s 22.7 days of onshore diesel (15 March) to the screenshot data’s 18.1 days (22 March) represents a loss of 4.6 days of onshore diesel cover in one week – despite the arrival of several vessels in that period.

If Friday’s figures show onshore diesel below 15 days, the gap between the MSO minimum and physical stock will have more than doubled in a fortnight. If the confirmed vessel pipeline beyond 5 April remains as thin as the current fortnight, the depletion arithmetic becomes self-executing regardless of diplomatic developments over the weekend.

7. Conclusion: The Invoice Arrives

Paper Three concluded that New Zealand did not arrive at its current position through malice or simple negligence, but through the consistent application of a philosophy that treated energy as a market commodity to be purchased at minimum cost rather than a strategic resource to be secured at adequate resilience. This paper adds the operational dimension to that structural argument.

The conveyor belt is the physical expression of that philosophy. One large vessel per week to Marsden Point. Three to four medium vessels per week to the regional terminals. Four to five arrivals nationally, delivering just enough to match daily consumption, with a 21-day buffer that can be met partly with fuel still at sea. That is not a reserve. It is a system with no tolerance for disruption – and it is being disrupted now.

The full fuel spectrum has entered the crisis simultaneously. Diesel onshore is below MSO. Jet fuel onshore is below MSO. Petrol onshore is below MSO. Philippine Airlines is being told it may not be able to refuel at destination airports. QatarEnergy has declared force majeure on LNG for up to five years. Korean naphtha restrictions have pushed petrochemical inventories to two weeks. The conversation about ‘the fuel crisis’ as if it is a single product problem is analytically wrong and will produce wrong policy responses.

Three findings from this analysis warrant stating plainly:

•       Four ships per week is the waterline. Below that number, onshore stocks deplete. The confirmed pipeline for the fortnight ending 5 April is two vessels. The government cannot confirm what follows.

•       This is not a diesel crisis. It is a refinery output crisis expressing itself simultaneously in diesel, jet fuel, LPG, petrol and naphtha. Policy responses calibrated only to diesel will fail to address the full economic exposure. Policy responses calibrated only to petrol even less so.

•       The window for administrative preparation is open now – and closing. Sector prioritisation lists, upstream terminal allocation, emergency procurement from India, IEA ticket conversion to physical product: none of these can be implemented at the speed the arithmetic demands if the decision to implement them is made after April 1. 

Friday’s data will either confirm that the conveyor belt is slowing toward a manageable disruption, or it will confirm that the disruption has already moved beyond the range that available policy responses can address in the required timeframe. Either way, the paper that follows will have a clearer foundation than this one.

New Zealand’s energy vulnerability is not bad luck. It is the accumulated invoice for two decades of decisions that priced resilience at zero. That invoice is now due.

Notes and Sources

1 MBIE Fuel Stocks Update, published 25 March 2026 (data as at midnight 22 March 2026). Published twice-weekly. Available at mbie.govt.nz.

2 Channel Infrastructure Annual Report FY2025: Marsden Point throughput 3.5 billion litres; vessel calls FY22–25 (56, 70, 61, 51). Available at channelnz.com.

3 MBIE average daily consumption data: diesel 10.7 million litres; total fuel 25 million litres per day (12-month averages).

4 Newsroom, 24 March 2026: ExxonMobil hires Goldman Sachs for likely NZ exit; confirmed by Newsroom sources. newsroom.co.nz.

5 Bloomberg interview with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, March 2026: aviation fuel grounding risk; Cebu Pacific route suspensions confirmed by airline announcement.

6 IATA jet fuel price data, Asia-Oceania: US$197/barrel, week of 23 March 2026. Crack spread data: Platts Singapore kerosene assessments.

7 QatarEnergy force majeure declaration, 4 March 2026; CEO statement on three-to-five year repair timeline for Ras Laffan LNG trains; confirmed product scope (LNG, LPG, condensate, naphtha, sulphur).

8 Argus Media, 24 March 2026: battery minerals mining diesel exposure; Singapore gasoil and jet fuel price movements from 28 February baseline.

9 South Korea Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy: export cap announcement 13 March 2026; export ban review expected 27 March 2026. Argus Media 19 March 2026 confirmation.

10 Japan: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 commercial operation, March 2026; TEPCO announcement. Strategic reserve release: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 16 March 2026 (80 million barrels, largest since 1978).

11 Trump pause on Iran ultimatum: statement 23 March 2026; CNBC interview. Iran foreign ministry response: same date. Windward maritime AI: 94.2% strait transit reduction.

12 Clarksons transit data: approximately 10 tankers, 12 million barrels in past week versus 250 vessels, 300 million barrels pre-crisis norm.

13 UK North Sea: Oxford Smith School analysis; government position statement. UK government quote on fossil fuel price exposure.

14 National Fuel Plan framework: four-level Covid-style response structure confirmed by Prime Minister Luxon, Parliament 25 March 2026. Stuff.co.nz reporting.

15 Stuff.co.nz, 25 March 2026: ‘NZ fuel update: 18 days’ worth of diesel on land, more coming on the water.’ Glenn McConnell.

16 Australian S&P/ASX 200 Materials Index: 20.3% decline since 28 February 2026. NRMA/NSW Government service station outage data.

17 Stats NZ international merchandise trade: fuel import origin data 2023–24; South Korea 38%, Singapore 32%, Malaysia 15%, Japan 6.6%.

18 IEA emergency sharing mechanism; New Zealand oil ticket obligations with US, UK and Japan. IEA collective release: 400 million barrels, 11 March 2026.

19 Worldometer/EIA: New Zealand oil consumption 159,000 barrels per day (2024); total 9.2 billion litres annually. Fuel type breakdown: diesel 3.72b litres, petrol 2.84b litres, jet fuel 1.56b litres, LPG/other 0.36b litres.

20 Channel Infrastructure terminal network; Google/AI Mode synthesis drawing on channelnz.com, dia.govt.nz, National Freight and Supply Chain Strategy. Marsden Point idle tank capacity: 350–400 million litres (formerly crude storage). 

All data sourced from publicly available MBIE, Stats NZ, IEA, Channel Infrastructure, S&P Global, Reuters, Argus Media, Bloomberg, Newsroom and Stuff reporting as at 25 March 2026. Stephen Hay is the author. Claude AI assisted with research, analysis and drafting. Claude can make mistakes: sources, citations and conclusions have not been independently verified.