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Who Is Buying RNZ’s Excuses?

An $11.8 million loss has exposed the gap between reassuring platitudes and the numbers underneath.

Image credit: Chris Lynch Media.

Ani O’Brien
Like good faith disagreements and principled people. Dislike disingenuousness and Foucault. Care especially about women’s rights, justice, and democracy.

Radio New Zealand was expected to lose $470,000 this year. A loss, but one that would be relatively easy to swallow. Instead it lost $11.846 million after tax in the year to 30 June 2026. A loss 25 times larger than forecast and we did not find out about it until the opportunity to manage and mitigate had passed. An utter failing in governance and an almost unfathomable degree of burying their heads in the sand. CEO Paul Thompson was already on his way out at the end of this year, but has now departed immediately leaving Mark Stevens as acting CEO until Jason Winstanley starts next year. But what about the board? Some, including RNZ staff, are asking if the board should be sacked en masse. And if we dig into what has happened here, it is hard to disagree.

Even if we accept the board’s explanation that it relied on inaccurate financial reporting, this still leaves a serious governance failure to explain. Directors were overseeing a major property programme, restructuring, and a funding reduction. Surely they should have been applying enough scrutiny to these matters that they would have realised quickly how far spending was departing from the budget? What is now in the public record is concerning enough, regardless of whether their failings are down to incompetence, concealment, or both.

With just two months of the financial year remaining (in which they would record an $11.8 million loss), on 28 April 2026 the then-chair of the board Dr Jim Mather assured Minister Paul Goldsmith that RNZ was working to “clear and prudent financial plans”. The Crown entity did not likely rack up an $11 million bill in the last two months of the year so somewhere between describing the plans as “prudent” and writing the annual report the board either discovered the true financial picture or realised that hiding it was no longer an option. In his chair’s report written in June, Dr Mather says:

“RNZ’s considerable achievements must be considered alongside an extremely disappointing financial result. RNZ recorded a net deficit of $11.8 million for the year ended 30 June 2026, compared with a budgeted deficit of $0.5 million.”

The announced independent review into this extraordinary set of cock-ups will have to establish how this happened and who is ultimately responsible with the benefit of access to board papers, management reports, and correspondence. However, there is enough in the public record already to pass judgment on Radio New Zealand as an organisation. Though it is frankly impossible to understand how an institution with a professional board, an audit committee, external auditors, Treasury monitoring, and ministerial oversight got itself into this position at all.

Reviewing RNZ’s annual reports, letters of expectation, and various publicly available corporate documents, what emerges is an organisation whose financial position increasingly depended on the timing of property transactions and expenditure, and a precariousness that was masked by outward projections of confidence.

First of all, it needs to be clarified that recent reductions in government funding were already built into RNZ’s budget. Yes, NZ On Air’s operating funding fell by $4.6 million, from $66.606 million to $62.006 million and the broader government funding and fees line fell from $71.714 million to $67.269 million. RNZ certainly had less coming in than they did in previous years as the government tightened its belt, but the budget allowed for that. RNZ had forecast government funding and fees of $66.918 million and actually received $351,000 more than expected. So while the reduction can explain pressure on the organisation, it cannot explain why the result was so much worse than a forecast that already incorporated it.

To find the explanation we need to start in the most obvious of places: spending. Personnel expenses came in at $47.207 million rather than the budgeted $43.988 million and other operating expenses reached $32.140 million instead of $25.729 million. Added together, those overruns account for $9.630 million, a huge chunk of the loss.

Payroll alone shows how little regard the organisation had for its own budgets. They had planned for personnel costs to fall by $919,000 from the previous year, but instead they rose by $2.3 million. Personnel costs also included end of employment payouts of $1.374 million relating to 22 staff members when the year before it was just $181,000.

RNZ also points to some substantial property-related costs in its explanation of the blowout. There was $1.85 million for the Auckland relocation, $1.1 million in asset write-offs, $1 million to decommission the Henderson towers, and $1.7 million for remediation at Tītahi Bay. That’s $5.65 million. Reporting does not provide information as to whether these costs were forecasted correctly or if they came out under or over budget. But there is a note in the annual report’s ‘Explanations of Significant Variances Against Budget’ that says “Budgeted revenue includes $2.0m for land sales. This was incorrectly accounted for as revenue in the budget.”

Land sales and property are where the independent review should direct a lot of its attention. RNZ used land sales to make their books look dramatically better without making the business of broadcasting any more affordable. They used sales of RNZ property to plug holes caused by spending, but that land wasn’t always exactly theirs to use and ministers could direct that the net proceeds be returned to Crown accounts, as was the case with one large land sale in Henderson.

The biggest problem with using land sales to bolster the books, though, is that eventually you run out of land to sell. The other issue is that a sale generates cash, but an accounting gain arises only when the proceeds (after costs are deducted) are more than the land’s carrying value. That is the value already recorded in the accounts. For example, if land is recorded as valued at $5 million and is then sold for $5 million, the organisation has simply swapped land for cash, not earned another $5 million.

In 2024–25, RNZ budgeted to make $4.960 million, but instead lost $1.328 million before tax. Most of that difference appeared in “other revenue” which was $5.749 million below forecast and which RNZ attributed to the Tītahi Bay transaction slipping beyond year-end and described it as “a timing variance only”.

RNZ’s cash-flow statement that year also budgeted for $5.650 million from asset sales and only recorded $650,000. A $5 million shortfall. The Tītahi Bay sale did go through in August 2025 for $4.9 million (included in FY25/26). But this was not a cash injection of the same amount. The annual report 2024–25 records:

“On 31 August 2025, RNZ completed the unconditional sale and leaseback of the Titahi Bay property for $4.9 m. Settlement included $0.6m retained by the purchaser to fund specified remediation and seismic strengthening works, which RNZ will complete. RNZ has secured ongoing operational use of the site under a leaseback arrangement at an annual rent of approximately $0.2m. The initial lease term runs until 31 December 2032, with renewal rights.”

After the purchaser’s $600,000 is removed, the price left is $4.3 million before other transaction costs. Assuming rent began on 1 September 2025 and remains at $200,000 a year, RNZ will pay about $1.47 million in rent by the time the initial lease expires. So yes, the sale produced immediate cash, but it also created an ongoing rental obligation.

Timing simply explains why the transaction did not happen in FY2024/25, it doesn’t explain how it was going to make a difference to the poor financial performance given the sale price was of the approximate value already carried in the accounts and there were future works and rent to pay. Perhaps the aforementioned $2 million miscalculation related to this, but that is not specified and doesn’t line up perfectly.

RNZ has been using land sales to make up for poor financial performance for some time. In FY2016/17, the Hobson Street building and other assets generated $7.135 million in cash, but the recorded gain was $334,000. That year, RNZ scraped through with a pre-tax surplus of $36,000, but if we remove the asset sales gain (and everything else remains the same) the result would have been a $298,000 deficit. There is an important distinction though. Back then RNZ sold property for more than the value reported in its books. It contributed to the surplus. More recently, selling property has simply given RNZ cash to pay its bills.

You can see this in the 2025/26 accounts. RNZ paid out $4.25 million more than it took in from its day to day operations and spent another $16.01 million on assets. On the other side of the ledger it raised $6.19 million by selling assets and recorded $3.74 million in lease financing. Even with the sales, RNZ ended the year with $8.51 million in the bank, down from $18.84 million. We don’t know which bills the sale proceeds paid, but it does show that without the sales RNZ would have drained their cash down to $2.32 million.

Now. Let’s talk about Henderson. The annual report 2025/26 records an unconditional agreement in October 2026 to sell the Lincoln Road property for $51 million, with settlement expected this month. Three important things to note: first, a sale of that size would transform the immediate cash situation, but would not create $51 million of new profit. Second, the sale takes place this year so will be recorded in FY2026/27 and not change the $11.8 million loss of 2025/26. And thirdly, the money was not even RNZ’s to spend. In April, then-Chair Mather agreed with Minister Goldsmith that the Henderson proceeds would return to the Crown after transaction and maintenance costs. Mather clearly understood, saying “No funds are being retained for other purposes”.

But, by 13 November, new Chair Brent Impey was telling the New Zealand Herald that RNZ was hoping to pay the Crown a special dividend of more than $30 million (of the $51 million). He is apparently going to seek permission to use more of the proceeds for capital investment… if that allocation is agreed to by the minister. The problem with this is that there is no indication whatsoever that the government would entertain this. Both the (caretaker) prime minister and Goldsmith have said there will be no bail outs for RNZ and have been pretty hard-nosed about the revelations.

RNZ is denying that all of this amounts to using land sales to offset their performance failings and funding reductions. Its leadership claims to understand their obligations to operate within baseline funding, but if this is true they appear all too happy to disregard them.

Selling surplus property can be sensible, as can using the proceeds to finance a transition (where authorised properly). But the transition must end up being affordable because once land like in Henderson is sold, RNZ cannot sell it again to meet the next year’s pressures.

How this has gone on so long is concerning. There were red flags already waving in the cash flow spreadsheets. In 2024/25, RNZ claimed in their annual report that cash above budget reflected “disciplined cost control and careful management of capital expenditure”. Sounds good, but the numbers tell a different story. That year, operating cash flow fell from a positive $14.552 million to negative $51,000. Payments to staff rose by $4.796 million and payments to suppliers by $8.780 million, while operating cash receipts fell by $1.027 million. The increased expenditure explains almost the entire fall.

However, the closing bank balance rose from $15.563 million to $18.844 million. This was not, as the annual report claimed, due to “discipline” and “careful management”, rather the missing context is $8 million of maturing term investments. Cash and term investments combined had actually fallen from $23.563 million to $18.844 million, while operating cash flow had deteriorated substantially. RNZ did not demonstrate better cost control. They spent much more than the year prior and blew out budgets. A culture of overspending was being masked by the fruits of decisions from some time ago.

RNZ’s spending showed no signs at all of being reined in. They were also committing more and more of their future resources, creating pressure on their budgets from annual report to annual report. In the year to June 2025, the amount RNZ had committed to production work and capital projects more than doubled from $5.5 million to $12.7 million. Over the same year, the total it had committed to pay over the remaining life of its leases jumped from $2.3 million to $19.7 million and, of that, $3.25 million was due in the following 12 months. The rest was spread over several years, but every dollar already promised to a landlord is a dollar that RNZ would have less freedom to spend elsewhere.

Putting off work and investment helped that year’s figures and ensured a less ugly depreciation bill. The same goes for commissions. But this just kicks the can down the road. The cost will be there waiting eventually.

The publicly available accounts paint a picture of an organisation with valuable property holdings, substantial investment plans, and a deteriorating operating cash position. And the government was certainly aware of some of the red flags and was not silent. In March this year, Goldsmith’s letter to RNZ called for further savings, reduced reliance on reserves and land sales, and greater transparency with Treasury. All plainly instructions that were ignored or not taken particularly seriously. The letter also pointed out that the minister still had not received RNZ’s three-year capital plan. It was in response to this that Dr Mather reassured the minister that they had prudent financial plans.

While this establishes that concerns were being raised and pressure put on the board, it is evident that oversight mechanisms failed. Why was Dr Mather allowed to get away with a simple reassurance? Why was he not required to provide Treasury and the minister with evidence of their “prudence”? When it became obvious that they were going to cop a loss more than 25 times what they budgeted for, how was the matter escalated and treated with the seriousness it warrants? Did the minister ever receive the missing three-year capital plan? How on earth did this happen in the first place?

As I said earlier, the RNZ board contends that they are victims of inadequate internal reporting. This is terribly convenient given the person responsible for that reporting has now resigned and exited immediately. It is a serious matter regardless as governing an organisation depends on access to reliable information. It is just not good enough that directors were not able to rely on management and it raises the prospect of what else they were not aware of or misinformed about. It is also a confession of pretty slack governance. When huge amounts were being spent, budgets were not remotely being adhered to, and massive property transactions discussed, did they not ask for the relevant information? Could they not piece together a picture of something not being quite right?

There was no chance that RNZ could hide their collapsing financial house of cards from their external auditor Ernst & Young. All the chickens appear to be coming home to roost at the same time and on 10 November Auditor-General Grant Taylor said in a press release:

“EY is RNZ’s appointed auditor and is contracted by the Auditor-General to conduct RNZ’s annual audit. During the audit, the auditor examined the financial statements and performance information, assessed the risk of material misstatement, and obtained sufficient appropriate evidence to support the audit opinion. This work identified the issues now shared by RNZ.”

He further explained that “RNZ has announced it will commission an independent review.”

EY raised concerns initially with then-Chief Financial Officer Hilary Parker on 29 September 2026. RNZ says the wider management team learned of the concerns three days later on 2 October… the same day Parker resigned.

Parker was also at the centre of another significant failure that EY picked up on. In June 2026, RNZ arranged access to up to $5 million in bank borrowing. Essentially an overdraft it could draw on for cash. This is an issue because their existing ministerial approval was for up to $3.5 million and no additional permission was sought in increasing it. Accounts do show that borrowing reached $2.3 million during the year and had been paid by end of financial year on 30 June, but that is not the point. They do not get to bypass ministerial approval when it suits and paying it back does not retrospectively authorise the arrangement.

The board claims that they sought reassurance from senior management that ministerial permission was not needed and were told it was not. Jane Wrightson, who chaired the board committee responsible for scrutinising financial risk until June this year, says she raised the issue at a 9 June board meeting, but unfortunately her alleged comments are not recorded in the minutes. Impey also says that “a director” questioned the requirement in writing before RNZ obtained the larger overdraft, but the CFO advised that approval was unnecessary.

Parker’s abrupt exit does not look good for her or RNZ and, looking at the financial mess RNZ is in, some have subsequently suggested that she was not up to the job. She was appointed in June 2024 and RNZ presented her as an experienced financial leader, citing previous work at Spark and New Zealand Cricket, and an MBA from the University of Auckland. Whether that is true in practice should be examined as part of the independent review as limited information available online shows that Parker spent just 18 months at New Zealand Cricket and only part of that time was as head of finance. Her five years at Spark appear to have been roles in specific special projects rather than explicit organisational finance management. She may well have been a reasonable hire at the time, but given the serious failings under her watch at RNZ it is right to scrutinise whether she was actually up to the job.

RNZ has now disclosed that they are also seeking advice on another spending programme as they are not sure whether ministerial approval should have been sought for that too. They have admitted to selling $3.7 million worth of equipment with an agreement to pay rent to keep using it. The law treats this kind of thing like borrowing so it seems pretty likely that they would have needed ministerial approval, however it is unresolved currently. What is done is done and I suspect they will have to look for forgiveness rather than approval.

RNZ reluctance to expose themselves to scrutiny was on display in how they waited until the very last moment possible to admit wrongdoing or let on that anything was amiss. NZ On Air chief executive Cameron Harland said that despite funding RNZ, they did not find out about the substantial financial problems until 3.45pm on 9 November just before the rest of us found out. NZ On Air had already complained to RNZ about the delayed notification they received advising them of Parker’s resignation and again they were being kept in the dark until as late as possible.

It appears to me like they were hoping for some last minute reprieve. Hoping that some piece of land they hadn’t already flogged off would materialise and they wouldn’t need to advise key stakeholders of what a pickle they were in after all. It is evasive, arguably deceptive, and totally unacceptable behaviour. What makes it even more unacceptable, is the extraordinary amount of money we are paying these people.

Disgraced CEO Paul Thompson’s package included a $528,000 salary, $24,000 in superannuation, and a $59,000 performance payment. During his 13 years and two months running RNZ, Thompson oversaw not only the worsening financial situation, but also a plummeting in trust in his organisation between 2020 and 2024. RNZ disclosed total board remuneration for 2025/26 as $311,000, which is up from $254,000 the previous year, an increase of about 22 per cent. Chair Jim Mather received $78,000 up from $64,000 and Jane Wrightson received $43,000 up from $34,000. Most other directors received $30–39,000. RNZ attribute this to the government’s cabinet fees framework.

RNZ’s immediate financial position may improve markedly when the Henderson proceeds are received, depending on whether the incoming minister is willing to renegotiate how much of the money is returned to the Crown. However, the independent review into what has gone on must not mince words. It needs to point fingers and demand accountability. It might seem harsh to say Chair Brent Impey has to go given he only took over in July, but he was on the board prior to that. This is a failing so big, in my view, that it warrants a complete sacking of the board. They should be replaced by highly competent governance appointees with proven financial discipline and management.

In fact, instead of the plan RNZ has to make around 58 staff redundant, perhaps those at the top should go first. The floodgates have opened and staff are speaking openly about where they see money being splashed around, who is surplus to requirements, and who is the problem. Before asking frontline staff to bear the consequences of decisions they knew nothing about, the incoming minister would be better listening to them, those who work on the tools, rather than those who have sat on cushy salaries while acting with incompetence or deception toward the Crown (and taxpayers).

This article was originally published by Thought Crimes.

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